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Relying on government to protect your privacy is like asking a peep-
ing tom to install your window blinds.1 
—John Perry Barlow 
In the end, if the people cannot trust their government to do the job 
for which it exists to protect them and to promote their common 
welfare—all else is lost.2 
—Barack Obama 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Take a moment to visit one of the following websites: Spokeo.com,3 
PeopleLookup.com,4  PrivateEye.com,5  or, if time is of the essence, 
PublicRecordsNOW.com.6 Type in your name and look at the results. 
What you will find is not just the result of the website query, but in 
fact the outcome of modern big data collection and analytics. The  
aggregation of personal information presents unique and often  
amorphous threats to personal privacy,7  potential harms that the 
protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution (as interpreted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court) appear insufficient to guard against.8 Per-
haps corporations, not the government, would be more effective at 
ensuring the fidelity and security of consumer information. Corporate 
actions and public statements over the past few years would suggest 
that corporations are eager to take on the mantle of data protection 
and crown themselves guardians of our personal data. For example, 
in February 2016, following the mass shooting attack in San Bernar-
dino, California, Apple refused to comply with an official order from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to unlock one of the sus-
pected perpetrators’ iPhones—an action which, in Apple’s view, 
risked the privacy and security of its customers, including tens of 
millions of Americans.9 A public refusal of this nature could signify a 
change in the environment of personal privacy. As companies, like Ap-
ple, present themselves as the proper entities to watch over our data, 
                                                                                                                       
 1. John Perry Barlow, Decrypting the Puzzle Palace, 35 COMM. ACM 25, 26 (1992). 
 2. Senator Barack Obama, An Honest Government, a Hopeful Future, Address to the 
University of Nairobi (Aug. 28, 2006). 
 3. SPOKEO, http://www.spokeo.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 4. PEOPLELOOKUP, http://www.peoplelookup.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 5. PRIVATEEYE, http://www.privateeye.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 6. PUBLICRECORDSNOW, http://www.publicrecordsnow.com (last visited July 30, 
2017). To be fair, there is no evidence that this website’s name is actually representative of 
the company’s response time. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III. 
 9. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/ 
customer-letter [https://perma.cc/F2BA-5LLU]. 
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however, consumers should consider whether they trust these compa-
nies, or the government for that matter, to safeguard their privacy. 
 The Pew Research Center released a report in 2015 that high-
lights the dramatic differences between how people feel about their 
personal data and how confident they are in either governmental 
agencies or corporations to keep that data safe.10 The report details 
the findings of multiple surveys of adults in the United States, and 
was intended to ascertain their views of privacy and personal data 
following “the ongoing revelations of government surveillance activi-
ties introduced in 2013 by the ex-National Security Agency contrac-
tor Edward Snowden.”11 According to the study, 93% of Americans 
think it is important that they control who has their data,12 while  
only 6% are “very confident” in the government’s ability to keep that 
data secure.13 Corporations didn’t fare much better in the report, with 
credit card companies being trusted only slightly more than the gov-
ernment (9% “very confident”), and even less confidence was reported 
when dealing with telephone companies, email providers, and cable 
television providers (roughly 5% “very confident”).14 
 If the American people have almost equally low confidence in cor-
porations and governmental agencies, then perhaps both entities 
would benefit from taking actions that would generate greater confi-
dence among the public. This Article examines the relevant threat 
that big data, and data brokers, in particular, pose to the privacy of 
individuals and what, if any, constitutional and legal rights affirma-
tively protect the privacy of personal information. There are four  
possible public- and private-sector solutions to challenge this threat: 
(1) more aggressive regulation under existing statutory authority; (2) 
expanding the authority of agencies to regulate through new legisla-
tion; (3) the possibility of a corporate right to privacy as a barrier to 
governmental intrusion; and (4) market-based solutions as small-
scale strategies for individuals to protect their data. Each of these 
solutions has the potential to strengthen or add a layer of protection 
to the disclosure of private data, although none in isolation is fully 
sufficient. A more holistic approach—utilizing all of these solutions—
can make personal information less accessible to undesired recipi-
ents, more secure and accurate for desired applications, and more 
                                                                                                                       
 10. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES 
ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE (2015). 
 11. Id. at 1. 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id. at 7. 
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transparent to the individual whose data it is, fundamentally, in the 
first place. 
 Part II of this Article examines the threat that the accumulation 
of information presents and the effect on personal privacy caused by 
the industry of data brokers that have proliferated around the use of 
big data. As individuals continue to disclose massive amounts of per-
sonally identifying information to companies around the globe, the  
collection and sale of this information has created a large and sub-
stantially unregulated industry that indiscriminately sells personal 
information about private citizens. 
 Part III looks at the interaction between the Constitution and the 
ever-evolving right to privacy, through the interpretation and deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. The Part begins with a brief history of 
the right to privacy before moving on to the state of that right in 
modern society.  
 Part IV discusses current federal regulation of big data and the 
statutes, or lack thereof, that govern it. This Part features acts that 
affect the collection of emails, the reporting of health-related infor-
mation and credit transactions, the criminalization of identity theft, 
and the transparency of government-held information. 
 Part V identifies and analyzes potential solutions, from both gov-
ernmental and corporate entities to the burgeoning threat posed by 
big data. Solutions on the governmental side include more aggressive 
regulation and new legislation pertaining to the government’s treat-
ment of big data. As for the private sector, this Part examines the 
possibility of a corporate right to privacy as a possible tool to protect 
private rights, as well as market-based solutions that allow individu-
als to contract with companies to protect their personal data, alt-
hough largely at a price. 
 Part VI briefly summarizes these facts, while suggesting that a 
multifaceted approach to combating big data would best counter the 
pervasive use of it. The proper “guardians of the galaxy of personal 
data” may be whoever can help protect it. More aggressive and ex-
pansive regulation could help the government rebound from public 
perception problems, given the relatively recent revelation that agen-
cies were conducting widespread clandestine surveillance. A corpo-
rate right to privacy coupled with the emergence of privacy-protection 
firms could help add another layer of protection while simultaneously 
helping companies grow confidence with consumers. This composite 
approach would ensure that regardless of who our “guardians” are, our 
personal information and private data are better protected. 
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II.   THE BIG DATA THREAT TO PERSONAL PRIVACY 
  The accumulation of personal information, and in particular the 
abuse of it by big data, poses a significant threat to the privacy of in-
dividual consumers. Due to technological advances in the collection, 
storage, and utilization of data, the sheer volume of information  
being aggregated today is unprecedented.15  Information related to 
areas of particular sensitivity, like personal health care and credit 
reporting, is strictly monitored and regulated by law. For example, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 pro-
tects personal data that is associated with information regarding the 
personal health or care of that individual.16 The Fair Credit Report-
ing Act (FCRA),17 on the other hand, governs the use of consumer in-
formation by credit reporting agencies.18 Most activities performed by 
data brokers and other companies that utilize big data, however, fall 
outside of the scope of the FCRA.19 Because the FCRA does not regu-
late these activities and entities, no federal regulations are governing 
the collection of personal data by the largest of all information aggre-
gators: data brokers.20 The threat to consumers, unfortunately, which 
is increasingly apparent, does not stem solely from the collection of 
health- or credit-sensitive information. Aggregation of less-sensitive 
information still poses a distinct and potent threat to personal priva-
cy, and the lack of regulation of these types of information is current-
ly being exacerbated by the data broker industry and has only been 
minimally addressed by the government. 
A.   The Aggregation of Personal Information 
 The corporate desire for aggregated information is palpable, with 
an expanding online marketplace demanding increasingly accurate 
consumer information to target a diverse and unlimited mass of  
users.21 America’s ever-increasing dependence on the digital, rather 
than the physical, storage of information has resulted in an unprece-
                                                                                                                       
 15. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 4 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES]. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 18. Id. 
 19. FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, at i 
(2014) [hereinafter DATA BROKERS]. Data brokers and other companies using big data are 
exempt from the FCRA because they either do not qualify as a “consumer reporting agen-
cy” or the information they collect and sell does not qualify as a “consumer report” under 
the law. Id. at 5 n.10, 56 n.106; see also discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 20. See discussion infra Part V. 
 21. See generally BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15. 
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dented accumulation of personal information.22 According to the  
Supreme Court, “[t]he capacity of technology to find and publish per-
sonal information, including records required by the government, 
presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal pri-
vacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”23 
 Social and professional interactions, in particular, are becoming 
reliant on third parties to foster both personal and business relation-
ships as they are increasingly occurring online. Companies search for 
employees online, and potential employees research and apply for 
jobs online. Sites like LinkedIn provide networking opportunities, 
and professionals establishing an online business profile or resume is 
becoming commonplace and even expected.24 Facebook sees its mis-
sion as keeping individuals from being uninformed of—or inadvert-
ently excluded by—their social group,25 and Twitter26 has evolved to 
break news faster than any other news source.27 Most people, howev-
er, are unaware of the gathering of information about them and the 
use and sale of that information for purposes such as future market-
ing and publishing.28 And even when they are made aware of this 
price, many consumers continue to use these services, despite their 
expressed discomfort with the invasion of privacy, as they either rely 
on the service provided or are daunted by the scope of the problem 
and any solutions (or both).29 
                                                                                                                       
 22. See, e.g., IBM, 10 KEY MARKETING TRENDS FOR 2017 AND IDEAS FOR EXCEEDING 
CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS 3 (2016) (“90% of the data in the world today has been created in 
the last two years alone . . . .”); Big Data and the Future of Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/big-data [https://perma.cc/753S-5GY3] (finding that 
Google processes thousands of times more data in a day than exists in the entire printed 
material of the U.S. Library of Congress).  
 23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011). 
 24. About Us, LINKEDIN, https://press.linkedin.com/about-linkedin [https://perma.cc/ 
V974-EGEW] (“LinkedIn [is] the world’s largest professional network with more than 546 
million users in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide.”). 
 25. Mark Zuckerberg, Bringing the World Closer Together, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2017, 
10:25 AM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10154944663901634 [https://perma.cc/ 
KTV7-PANA]. Facebook changed its mission statement to “bring the world closer together,” 
while the CEO’s post announcing the change focused on Facebook gaining an even greater 
role in communities across the globe. Id. 
 26. TWITTER, https://twitter.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 27. See Barry Ritholtz, How Twitter Is Becoming the First and Quickest Source of 
Investment News, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
how-twitter-is-becoming-your-first-source-of-investment-news/2013/04/19/19211044-a7b3-
11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7RT-3YSM]. 
 28. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at i. 
 29. See Thomas McMullan, Guardian Readers on Privacy: ‘We Trust Government Over 
Corporations’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2015/oct/18/guardian-readers-on-privacy-we-trust-government-over-corporations. The Guard-
ian found that the public trusts the government more than private companies with their 
information, particularly as far as motivations for collecting personal data, but had rela-
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 1.   “Big Data” 
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) notes that “[i]n today’s 
economy, Big Data is big business.”30 But what is “big data,” and why 
is it important? The term “big data” is somewhat undefined and var-
ies depending on the industry, but generally the definition involves 
the collection of (1) large volumes of (2) complex, structured datasets 
that are (3) processed via some form of technology.31 According to the 
Executive Office of the President, “definitions reflect the growing tech-
nological ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-greater 
volume, velocity, and variety of data.”32 Big data is viewed by some as 
property or even a public resource, presenting economic and other op-
portunities, while others see it as an expression of personal identity, 
threatening constitutional rights and personal liberties.33 In determin-
ing whether the collection of information rises to the level of big data, 
experts may examine the data in terms of the “3 Vs.”34 The 3 Vs (vol-
ume, variety, and velocity) can be used to identify datasets that are “so 
large in volume, so diverse in variety or moving with such velocity, 
that traditional modes of data capture and analysis are insufficient.”35  
 The first V, volume, describes the amount of information collected 
and utilized.36 Declining costs in data processing and storage, coupled 
with an explosion of information provided by everything from web-
sites to web-enabled devices,37 have created large volumes of digital 
information for entities like corporations and governmental agencies 
                                                                                                                  
tively strong distrust of both public and private data collectors’ ability to properly safe-
guard their privacy or use the data for permissible means. Id. 
 30. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at i. 
 31. JONATHAN STUART WARD & ADAM BARKER, UNDEFINED BY DATA: A SURVEY OF BIG 
DATA DEFINITIONS 1-2 (2013), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1309.5821.pdf [https://perma.cc/29XS-
GRAG]. The authors concluded with the following definition: “Big data is a term describing 
the storage and analysis of large and or complex datasets using a series of techniques in-
cluding, but not limited to: NoSQL, MapReduce and machine learning.” Id. at 2. The com-
puter-based processing is key to analyzing enormous, complex datasets. Id. 
 32. BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15, at 2. 
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 4; FTC, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 1 (2016) 
[hereinafter DATA EXCLUSION]. 
 35. BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15, at 4. 
 36. Id.; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT—BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE]. 
 37. See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Internet of Things Connectivity Binge: What 
Are the Implications?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 6, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/ 
06/06/the-internet-of-things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the-implications [https://perma.cc/ 
S9WP-4NSY]. The “Internet of Things” describes the constellation of devices and applianc-
es that are internet-connected and/or artificial-intelligence-enhanced, such as voice-
activated assistants, smart electronics from thermostats to televisions, and monitoring 
devices to track one’s health or secure one’s home. Id. 
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to accumulate, explore, and potentially exploit. Another component 
that distinguishes big data is the wide variety of sources from which 
the information is usually obtained.  
 The second V, variety, encapsulates this idea, where personal in-
formation may be sourced from data which is either “born digital” or 
“born analog.”38 Information that is “born digital” is not derived from 
physical sources, but rather is created and exists entirely in digital 
form.39 This data originates in a computer system and is created by 
users or the system itself, such as an email server, which records who 
sent a communication, to whom the message was sent, the time it 
was sent, and the content of the email.40 In contrast, information that 
is “born analog” arises from the physical world, where behaviors and 
effects are captured by a sensor, such as a camera, a microphone, or 
an antenna.41 This data is translated from its physical form into a 
digital format that can be analyzed together with information that 
was born digital.42 Data that is born analog includes personal physi-
cal characteristics, forms filled out physically by individuals, and au-
dio and video recordings of people and places, which is later convert-
ed to digital form or quantified to enable analysis and tabulation.43  
 The final V, velocity, encompasses types of data that are created 
and sent very quickly, increasingly offering analysis in real time, 
with the ability to affect a person’s immediate environment and deci-
sionmaking. 44  Global Positioning System (GPS) data, click-stream 
tracking on websites, and automatically associated time or location 
information are all examples of high-velocity interactions that expose 
information about individuals using those services.45 
 Big data is not inherently bad, or innately good for that matter: it 
can be used or misused for both positive and negative ends, for a  
variety of purposes, and by a wide variety of actors. Big data is used to 
obtain insights into individual behavior, preferences, and patterns—
                                                                                                                       
 38. See TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 36, at 19, 22. 
 39. Id. at 19-21. 
 40. See id. Other types of “born digital” information include data such as cellphone 
metadata, GPS location data, credit card swipes, RFID tags, and keystrokes and clicks 
from computers, tablets, phones, and video games. Id. at 19-20. 
 41. See id. at 22-23. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. Other types of “born analog” information include data such as voice and 
video content of phone calls, surveillance videos, medical imaging and data from personal 
health trackers, and fingerprint and DNA data. Id. at 22. 
 44. BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15, at 5. Indeed, there is high demand to 
provide analysis or responsive transmission of certain types of data in ways that benefit 
users instantly, such as the need for mobile mapping applications to have immediate, accu-
rate access to the user’s location. Id. 
 45. See id.  
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enabling personalization, learning, and even prediction.46 Governmen-
tal agencies and corporations alike have made efforts to take ad-
vantage of big data to “boost economic productivity, drive improved 
consumer and government services, thwart terrorists, and save 
lives,”47 by making processes more efficient, accurate, and effective. 
On the governmental side, for example, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services use big data to identify likely instances of fraud, 
while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) uses 
big data to help military personnel deployed in the field assess and 
solve operational challenges.48 On the private sector side, big data 
has been used in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) to identify 
newborns who are at greater risk of illness.49 Additionally, big data 
has played a substantial role in targeted or retargeted advertising,50 
where companies use data analytics to advertise to specific consum-
ers that already have a strong preference for their product.51 In fact, 
one emerging corporate marketing technique, called customer rela-
tionship marketing (CRM) retargeting (or data onboarding), com-
bines online and offline data to target and deliver advertising to 
online users based on their identity.52 
 A 2016 White House report recognized that big data analytics are 
often assumed to be unbiased and objective, disinterestedly revealing 
the true behavior and characteristics of consumers through large-
scale inputs and data-driven algorithms.53 The report focused on the 
impact of big data on access to opportunities and examined the per-
meating influence of big data on the activities and lives of modern 
                                                                                                                       
 46. Id. at 5-7. 
 47. Id. at 5. 
 48. Id. at 6. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Christian Madsbjerg & Mikkel B. Rasmussen, Advertising’s Big Data Dilemma, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 7, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/advertisings-big-data-dilemma 
[https://perma.cc/2KL4-BPVT]. 
 51. Ganesh Iyer, David Soberman & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, The Targeting of Advertis-
ing, 24 MARKETING SCI. 461, 461 (2005) (discussing how companies that are able to use 
targeted advertising target the segment of consumers who show a strong preference for 
their product rather than comparison shoppers). 
 52. See Daniel Newman, CRM Targeting? The Next Wave of Big Data Utilization for 
Marketing, FORBES (June 3, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/ 
2015/06/03/crm-retargeting-the-next-wave-of-big-data-utilization-for-marketing (noting 
that CRM retargeting is leading advertisers to target online users based “more on identity 
than on behavior or preference”); see also DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at v. Data 
onboarding involves placing a cookie on a user’s computer with information about that 
user’s identity or preferences attached. Id. at 27. Often, advertisers first define “segments” 
of consumers, based on their characteristics or shopping habits, and attach that segment 
identity to the cookie as well. Id. at 27-28. 
 53. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, 
OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (2016) [hereinafter BIG DATA ALGORITHMS]. 
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Americans, including access to credit, employment, higher education, 
and criminal justice.54 The case studies in this report revealed the 
potential for discrimination and prejudice based on either the inputs 
used in the analytics or issues with the design and functioning of the 
algorithm itself.55 As industry experts have expressed, big data can 
expand customer intelligence or the ability of a company to under-
stand its customers; improve operational efficiencies through predic-
tive analytics; create new business processes based on mobile tech-
nologies; and offer marketing solutions to companies that are ill-
equipped to build robust datasets.56 Undoubtedly, big data provides 
and potentially foreshadows significant benefits to governmental 
agencies, corporations, and consumers. However, to take advantage of 
big data, private and public entities must first have accurate, efficient 
access to it—which is precisely where data brokers come into play. 
2.   Data Brokers: The Quintessential Personal Data Aggregators 
 Companies that amass, aggregate, and resell personal information 
are known as “data brokers.”57 Data brokers develop files on individ-
ual consumers, most likely including you,58 based on both online and 
offline data, containing everything from state records and census re-
ports to in-store purchases and personal internet browsing history.59 
According to the FTC, most consumers are unaware that data bro-
kers even exist and to what extent they are tracking our individual 
activities.60 Data brokers, like Acxiom—one of the world’s largest con-
sumer information companies61—claim that they “don’t want to know 
intimate facts about you,”62 but that is exactly what they are selling.  
                                                                                                                       
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. Id. at 6-11. 
 56. Sashi Reddi, 4 Ways Big Data Will Transform Business, CSC WORLD, Winter 
2013, at 12-13, https://web.archive.org/web/20140211063333/https://assets1.csc.com/cscworld/ 
downloads/CSCWorld_Winter_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG62-LQ7Z]. 
 57. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at 3. 
 58. See id. at iv (noting that the FTC found that one data broker alone had “3000 data 
segments for nearly every U.S. consumer”). 
 59. Id. at iv-v. 
 60. Id. at 3. 
 61. See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-
consumer-database-marketing.html (“[A]nalysts say [Acxiom] has amassed the world’s larg-
est commercial database on consumers . . . .”); see also ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com (last 
visited July 30, 2017). 
 62. Acxiom, How Do Companies Get Data About Me and What Do They Do with It?, 
ABOUTTHEDATA.COM, https://www.aboutthedata.com/how [https://perma.cc/2WH8-25RD]. 
Although Acxiom promises that they do not want or share “intimate” facts about you, they 
limit the definition of intimate to include things such as social security numbers, credit and 
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 Data brokers primarily deal in the sale of datasets, analytical 
tools, risk mitigation techniques, and people search products.63 Data 
brokers may sell particular data points, like an individual’s email 
address, to outside companies, enabling them to advertise directly to 
the consumer.64 They may also sell analytical tools to sift through 
consumer datasets in order to better target potential customers.65 
Beyond supplementing marketing strategies, data brokers often sell 
risk mitigation products that are used to detect and prevent fraud by, 
for example, confirming someone’s identity or flagging suspicious be-
havior.66 Finally, many data brokers use their access to a “galaxy” of 
consumer information to create or supply the data for “people search” 
websites.67 These sites allow users to find detailed information on in-
dividuals regardless of their association with those people or the pur-
pose of such a search.68 As is the case with much of the discussion 
concerning the flow of personal data, access to information provided 
by data brokers carries both positive and negative potential effects. 
On the one hand, among other potential benefits, people search ser-
vices can unite old friends, provide invaluable background infor-
mation on potential employees, and inform companies about their 
customers. 69  On the other hand, these services have been used to  
facilitate criminal acts—such as tax fraud70 and stalking71—as well as 
legal, but unsettling or improper acts, such as predatory targeting of 
victims of rape, individuals who have AIDS, or seniors with dementia.72 
                                                                                                                  
“detailed” financial information, and medical information. Id. Not everyone would agree 
that those are the only intimate facts about a person. 
 63. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at ii-iii. 
 64. Id. at ii. 
 65. Id. For example, data brokers might analyze a company’s customer data to deter-
mine what region and media to target or to rank customers based on their web presence or 
potential response to marketing. Id. at ii-iii. 
 66. Id. at iii. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Francisco Alvarado, Miami Drug Dealers Used People Search Website for Tax Re-
turn Fraud Scheme, FLA. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Aug. 21, 2015), 
http://fcir.org/2015/08/21/miami-drug-dealers-used-people-search-website-for-tax-return-
fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/YX23-FP4T] (discussing a scheme in which two drug deal-
ers in Miami, Florida used a people search website to steal the personal information of 
unassociated individuals in order to obtain fraudulent tax refunds). 
 71. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at 48. 
 72. Melanie Hicken, Data Brokers Selling Lists of Rape Victims, AIDS Patients, CNN 
(Dec. 19, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/18/pf/data-broker-lists 
[https://perma.cc/5JJQ-R644] (noting that, for example, a list of seniors with dementia 
could be used to market predatory financial offers). 
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B.   The Dangers of Big Data 
 While big data, and the data brokers that help assemble and dis-
perse large datasets, can certainly be helpful or even valuable, the 
accumulation of personal and identifying information poses a sub-
stantial and very real risk to consumers. The potential for harm is 
rooted in both how the collected information is used and how that 
information can be stolen or exposed due to a security breach.73 Addi-
tionally, for most existing big datasets, there is no meaningful way 
for consumers to determine who has their information, how to access 
or correct it, or how to limit the sharing of information if that is even 
possible.74 Each type of potential harm is distinct, dangerous, and has 
in fact resulted in serious consequences for consumers through, for 
example, lost opportunities due to biases or inaccuracies in the data 
or algorithms.75 These harms, on their own and in aggregate, present 
a significant threat to personal privacy that requires serious and 
immediate attention.  
 1.   The Misuse of Data in General 
 The potential for consumer harm from the misuse of big data is 
evident in both corporate and governmental environments. As the 
White House report on big data’s impact on opportunities noted, 
sharing information with companies “enables a greater degree of im-
provement and customization, but this sharing also creates opportu-
nities for additional uses of our data that may be unexpected, inva-
sive, or discriminatory.” 76  Misuse by individuals and entities can 
range from broad, sweeping actions to small, specific instances of 
conduct. Regardless of the scope and effect of such misuse, though, 
the temptation to invade the personal privacy of others in the context 
of the proliferation of big data can result in real harm to consumers. 
 This harm may include invasions of privacy that are improper or 
disquieting, but legally permissible. The now-infamous PRISM pro-
gram is one example of big data collection and use by a governmental 
agency that was wide-ranging in effect and extremely controversial 
in terms of public perception. PRISM was a surveillance system used 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) to obtain information regard-
                                                                                                                       
 73. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at v-vi. 
 74. Id. at 50 (outlining recommendations for new legislation to provide consumers 
with access to their data and an ability to “opt-out” of having one’s data shared for market-
ing purposes). 
 75. BIG DATA ALGORITHMS, supra note 53, at 6-8. 
 76. Id. at 5. 
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ing foreign intelligence77 and operated in secrecy until NSA contrac-
tor-turned-whistleblower Edward Snowden exposed the program’s 
existence.78 The program was authorized by section 702 of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),79 and allows the govern-
ment, with FISA Court approval, to obtain and collect information, 
such as emails, photos, and phone logs, from electronic communica-
tion service providers.80 As the Director of National Intelligence em-
phasized at the time that the public learned of the program, “PRISM 
is not an undisclosed collection or data mining program. It is an in-
ternal government computer system used to facilitate the govern-
ment’s statutorily authorized collection . . . from electronic communi-
cation service providers.”81 While the exposure of PRISM was met 
with public attention and even outrage,82 clandestine operations per-
formed by the government are only one broad way in which big data 
presents harms that are difficult to identify and prevent, yet intui-
tively feel to be violations of our collective privacy rights. 
 2.   Relying on Inaccurate Information 
 Incorrect information, or accurate information that is incorrectly 
interpreted, can also present unwanted consequences for consum-
ers.83 Individuals may be erroneously excluded from certain transac-
tions, such as loans or large purchases, based on incorrect infor-
mation,84 though data brokers are quick to point out that the ex-
change of information about the customer is intended to “inform a 
transaction, not stop it.”85 Big data may reinforce prejudices and finan-
                                                                                                                       
 77. DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, FACTS ON THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE PUR-
SUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 1 (2013)  
[hereinafter PRISM]. 
 78. See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, WASH. 
POST: WONKBLOG (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/ 
06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date [https://perma.cc/PT24-DELQ]. 
 79. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 80. PRISM, supra note 77, at 171. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. See, e.g., Edward Snowden: Leaks That Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC (Jan. 7, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964 [https://perma.cc/CMH3-KV6P]; 
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, 
Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data [https://perma.cc/K74T-SJVS]; Steven Levy, How the NSA 
Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/ 
01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet [http://perma.cc/5FAN-RD3U]. 
 83. DATA BROKERS, supra note 19, at v. 
 84. Id. Companies, such as insurers, also often rely on big data to determine rates and 
service levels. Id. at 48. 
 85. Sam Pfeifle, Industry Reaction to FTC Data Brokers Report: Eh., IAPP (May 28, 
2014) (quoting Stuart Pratt, president and CEO of the Consumer Data Industry Associa-
 
274  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:261 
 
cial disparities as well. According to the FTC, “when big data is used to 
target ads, particularly for financial products, low-income consumers 
who may otherwise be eligible for better offers may never receive 
them.”86 Similarly, online companies that utilize big data may charge 
more depending on the location of the user, which can result in higher-
priced goods and services for lower-income or minority communities.87 
 3.   Accurate but Revealing Information 
 Another potential threat to consumers, and one that inescapably 
challenges the boundaries of the constitutional right to privacy, is the 
danger that big data poses when it is accurate. Companies may cre-
ate and employ specific datasets for particular marketing purposes, 
but by collecting, organizing, and combining that information, the 
company may inadvertently expose sensitive or embarrassing infor-
mation about the consumer to third parties.88 In this instance, the 
more accurate and robust the information, the greater the potential 
for harm. One study found that researchers could predict defining 
characteristics about users, such as a user’s sexual orientation or po-
litical affiliation, based on Facebook “Likes” combined with limited 
survey data.89 Considering this predictive ability, and the pervasive-
ness with which companies utilize big data, it is easy to imagine a 
scenario where a company sends marketing materials to a prospec-
tive customer that exposes private information about him or her. For 
example, if the marketing is based on data that indicates a consum-
er’s sexual preference for the same sex, the materials could reveal the 
individual’s private, and perhaps unknown, sexual orientation to  
anyone that may come upon the mail. 
 Predictive analytics based on big data may also deny customers 
opportunities through no fault of their own.90 The accuracy of predic-
tive analysis depends first on the quality of the information on which 
it is based,91 but even where the data is accurate, companies may 
                                                                                                                  
tion), https://iapp.org/news/a/industry-reaction-to-ftc-data-brokers-report-eh [https://perma.cc/ 
8M9Z-XDCK]. 
 86. DATA EXCLUSION, supra note 34, at 10. 
 87. Id. at 11. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital 
Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5803-04 (2013) (“The model 
correctly discriminates between homosexual and heterosexual men in 88% of cases, African 
Americans and Caucasian Americans in 95% of cases, and between Democrat and Republi-
can in 85% of cases.”). 
 90. DATA EXCLUSION, supra note 34, at 9. 
 91. See Benjamin T. Hazen et al., Data Quality for Data Science, Predictive Analytics, 
and Big Data in the Supply Chain Management: An Introduction to the Problem and Sug-
gestions for Research and Applications, 154 INT’L J. PROD. ECON. 72, 72-80 (2014). 
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draw unwarranted conclusions or associations. In particular, credit 
card companies have used big data tools to rank customers,92 and, in 
some cases, companies have even lowered a customer’s credit limit 
based on similarities between that customer’s shopping habits and 
the habits of other customers with poor repayment histories.93 Unfair 
or unjust decisionmaking techniques like these show how companies 
may be tempted to abuse access to customer information and how 
overconfidence in big data may lead to erroneous judgments or even 
civil liability.94 
 4.   Reidentifying Anonymous Data 
 As big data has evolved, one fundamental aspect of the technolo-
gy—the ability to combine datasets and gain insight through analyz-
ing the aggregated data95—has matured to the point that an individ-
ual’s information found in anonymous datasets may now be reidenti-
fied, or deanonymized, by combing the information with other  
inputs.96 This process of combining multiple anonymous datasets in 
order to obtain personally identifying information is known as the 
“mosaic effect.”97 Technologies that are able to reassemble identifying 
personal data strip big data of one of the few safeguards employed 
and touted by the industry; namely, the anonymization of infor-
mation. 98  While problems related to the ineffective anonymity of  
datasets have been known for years,99 technological improvements 
and the increased availability of information have compounded the 
problem.100 Somewhat disturbingly, for example, a 2013 study was 
able to correctly identify up to ninety-seven percent of publicly avail-
able profiles in the Personal Genome Project by matching demo-
graphic information found in the profiles to public records.101  
                                                                                                                       
 92. DATA EXCLUSION, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that scores were used to reduce con-
sumers’ credit lines based on their purchase history). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Press Release, FTC, Subprime Credit Card Marketer to Provide At Least $114 
Million in Consumer Redress to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptive Conduct (Dec. 19, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/subprime-credit-card-marketer-
provide-least-114-million-consumer [https://perma.cc/7H6B-SJBF]. 
 95. DATA EXCLUSION, supra note 34, at 1. 
 96. BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15, at 8. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
 100. See generally BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15. 
 101. LATANYA SWEENEY ET AL., IDENTIFYING PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL GENOME 
PROJECT BY NAME, HARV. WHITE PAPER 1021-31 (2013), http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/ 
pgp/1021-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L5G-JRP2]. 
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III.   BIG DATA AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 Privacy, or the state of being alone or away from others,102 re-
mains highly valued by the vast majority of Americans.103 Although 
not specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution,104 the Supreme 
Court has recognized privacy as a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Constitution since the 1960s,105 and legal protections for privacy 
date back much further.106 The Framers of the Constitution grounded 
many of the early amendments, primarily in the Bill of Rights, in 
privacy protections. The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ments, for instance, all involve aspects of privacy and protection from 
having that privacy invaded by the government. The First Amend-
ment guards the sanctity of individual thought and the privacy of 
beliefs by proscribing the government from enacting laws limiting the 
free exercise of religion, speech, and assembly.107 The Third Amend-
ment guards the privacy of one’s home by barring the compulsory 
quartering of soldiers.108 The Fourth Amendment guards the privacy 
of one’s person and belongings by protecting against unreasonable 
search and seizure.109 The Fifth Amendment guards the privacy of 
thought and self-determination by protecting against self-
incrimination and requiring due process of law.110 Finally, the Ninth 
Amendment provides the basis for finding certain rights outside of 
the language of the Constitution: “The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”111 These Amendments, considered to-
gether, permitted the Supreme Court to codify the right to privacy as 
one of our fundamental constitutional guarantees.112 
                                                                                                                       
 102.  Privacy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/privacy [https://perma.cc/Y936-HU6D] (last updated Feb. 24, 2018).  
 103. MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that 88% of participants in the 
study reported that it was important not to “have someone watch or listen to them without 
their permission” and, concerning personal information, 90% expressed the importance of 
controlling what information about them was collected, while 93% said it was important to 
control who could obtain their data). 
 104. See generally William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966). 
 105. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 523-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 106. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 168 
(1769) (containing information relating to the crime of eavesdropping). 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 108. Id. amend. III. 
 109. Id. amend. IV. 
 110. Id. amend. V. 
 111. Id. amend. IX. 
 112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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A.   A Brief History of the Right to Privacy 
 The Supreme Court’s recognition of privacy as a guaranteed right 
began in the 1920s. The initial groundwork was set forth in 1923, in 
Meyer v. Nebraska.113 The Court held that a Nebraska law prohibit-
ing any subject to be taught in a foreign language was unconstitu-
tional, relying on protections not explicit in the Constitution to form 
its decision based largely on the concept of “liberty.” 114  Justice 
McReynolds, who delivered the opinion, wrote: 
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration 
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. With-
out doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but 
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the order-
ly pursuit of happiness by free men.115 
This broad definition of liberty, which was echoed by the Supreme 
Court two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,116 was the founda-
tion on which the Court based its reading of constitutional privacy 
rights in the 1960s. In determining whether an individual’s privacy 
rights have been violated, the Supreme Court recognizes that “cer-
tain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs 
asserted to justify their abridgment.”117 Therefore, governmental ac-
tions that affect individual privacy, as a component of liberty, require 
states to show a credible and convincing justification for the intrusion 
because reviewing courts examine the actions under strict scrutiny, 
the most demanding standard of judicial review.118 
                                                                                                                       
 113. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 114. Id. at 399. The Court extrapolated from the prohibition in the Fourteenth 
Amendment of any state depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).  
 115. Id. 
 116. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the Nebraska law interfered with the 
liberty of parents to choose how to raise their children). 
 117. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Griswold, 
381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing the right to privacy, in marital 
relations at least, as “fundamental and basic”). 
 118. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that strict scrutiny is 
required for review of state laws that irreversibly deprive persons of a basic liberty, such as 
procreation). Generally, strict scrutiny requires the state to show that the challenged law is 
narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest, using the least restrictive means to 
further that interest. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
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 1.  Recognition of Privacy Rights 
 The seminal privacy case, Griswold v. Connecticut,119 represents 
the first instance where the Supreme Court categorically confirmed 
the right of privacy for individuals.120 The Court came to this conclu-
sion based, in part, on a dissenting opinion from four years earlier in 
1961.121 In Poe v. Ullman,122 Justice Douglas wrote an impassioned 
dissent,123 urging that the Court recognize privacy considerations in 
deciding the case: “This notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue. 
It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under 
which we live.”124 Building on this concept, the Court in Griswold 
found that zones of privacy were created by constitutional guaran-
tees.125 Citing the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, in 
addition to stare decisis,126 the Court identified a right of privacy that 
it considered “older than the Bill of Rights.”127 Justice Douglas, this 
time writing on behalf of the majority, was able to reassert his once-
rebuffed view on privacy, proclaiming that “the right of privacy which 
presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”128 
 Privacy protection continued to play a crucial role in decisions  
following Justice Douglas’s 1965 dissent in Griswold. For example, in 
1967, the Supreme Court set the basic rule that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable, with a few exceptions, under the Fourth 
Amendment in Katz v. United States.129 The Court in Katz focused on 
a person’s expectation of privacy,130 a principle which would continue 
to play a role in future Supreme Court decisions.131 The unanimous 
1969 Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Georgia132 held that the 
                                                                                                                       
 119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 120. Id. at 484. See generally Beaney, supra note 104. 
 121. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 122. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 123. Id. at 509-522 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). 
 125. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 126. Id. at 484-85. 
 127. Id. at 486. 
 128. Id. at 485. 
 129. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 130. Id. at 359. The Katz Court held the electronic surveillance of a telephone booth 
was a search, and therefore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 357-58. Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion summarized the decision as holding that a phone booth is a 
type of place, like the home, where a person has an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy and that electronic, as well as physical, intrusion into those spaces is presumptive-
ly invalid in the absence of a warrant. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 131. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547 (1978). 
 132. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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personal possession of obscene material, taken by itself, was protect-
ed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 133  The Court 
stressed that regulating obscenity was indeed a power held by states, 
but concluded that the Constitution limited such power in order to 
protect private citizens’ liberty.134 The Court noted that “[f]or also 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstanc-
es, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”135 
 The following decade also saw important cases relying on protec-
tions derived from the right to privacy.136 In the momentous 1973 
case, Roe v. Wade,137 for instance, the Supreme Court determined 
that the right to privacy protected a woman’s personal choice to pro-
ceed with, or terminate, a pregnancy.138 In holding that the near-
universal ban on abortions challenged in Texas criminal abortion 
statutes was unconstitutional,139 Justice Blackmun noted that “the 
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee 
of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitu-
tion.”140 The Supreme Court also often contemplated well-established 
customs and traditions to help inform decisions on personal privacy. 
For example, in Kelley v. Johnson,141 the Court looked at the preva-
lence among states and local communities of imposing constraints on 
the personal appearance of uniformed law enforcement officers to de-
termine the permissibility of those constraints.142 Finding that the 
vast majority of states employed restrictions on uniformed police per-
sonnel—such as the mandatory haircuts at issue in the case—and 
that such techniques were used to meet the public need to more easi-
ly identify officers and to unify the police force, the Court found no 
violation of the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.143 Similarly, 
in Moore v. East Cleveland,144  the Supreme Court relied on well-
established American traditions related to the privacy and sanctity of 
                                                                                                                       
 133. Id. at 568.  
 134. Id. The Court emphasized the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of 
their perceived “social worth,” and the fundamental right to read and observe whatever a 
person wants in the privacy of their own home, as components of the bedrock unconstitution-
ality of the government trying to control what its citizenry thinks and believes. Id. at 564-65. 
 135. Id. at 564. 
 136. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 137. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
 138. Id. at 164. 
 139. Id. at 166. 
 140. Id. at 152. 
 141. Kelley, 425 U.S. 238. 
 142. Id. at 248. 
 143. Id. at 248-49. 
 144. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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family in holding that the choice of living arrangements within a 
family, as a liberty interest, was protected under the Constitution.145 
 2.   Limiting Protection Due to the Expectation of Privacy 
 The contours of privacy protection, however, began to become 
more defined and narrow by the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, 
with the Supreme Court focusing on the reasonableness of an indi-
vidual’s expectation of privacy in a given situation as a means to de-
termine whether an intrusion on his privacy was reasonable. In 1978, 
the Supreme Court, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,146 declined to ex-
tend privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment to warranted 
searches of third-party premises, even of newspaper offices. 147  In 
1979, the Court, in Smith v. Maryland,148  failed to apply privacy 
rights to records of telephone numbers dialed.149 Both of these cases 
examined the expectation of privacy held by the individual. Likewise, 
Supreme Court decisions throughout the 1980s analyzed potential 
invasions of individual privacy and whether an expectation to that 
privacy existed to begin with.150 The decision in California v. Green-
wood,151 for example, eliminated privacy rights to personal items dis-
carded as garbage and left on a public street.152 The Court decided 
that by placing the trash on the curb, the respondents had sufficient-
ly surrendered and exposed their items to the public for the express 
purpose of giving those items up to a third party, negating any rea-
sonable expectation to privacy.153 
 3.   Cultural Values and the Right to Privacy 
 More recent privacy-related cases share a common theme with 
older cases. The decisions in these cases mirror broader cultural 
changes occurring in America at the time and represent an integra-
tion of those cultural shifts into the modern concept of privacy. In Roe 
                                                                                                                       
 145. Id. at 500-01, 504 (extending constitutional protections for family relationships 
and childrearing to non-nuclear family relations, such as grandparents, aunts, and uncles). 
 146. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 147. Id. at 567-68. 
 148. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 149. Id. at 745-46 (holding that a person does not have a legitimate or actual expecta-
tion of privacy in the phone numbers he or she dials). 
 150. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35 (1988). 
 151. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 152. Id. at 37, 40. 
 153. Id. at 40-41. The Court emphasized that outdoor garbage disposal is intended to 
be picked up by garbage collectors and could also be searched by animals, children, scaven-
gers, and strangers. Id. 
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v. Wade, for example, privacy considerations encompassing a wom-
an’s decision whether to continue her pregnancy, in the context of 
progress in women’s rights, led to the Court’s invalidation of abortion 
statutes.154 Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,155 a Supreme 
Court decision from 1990, and Lawrence v. Texas,156 decided in 2003, 
also involved privacy-related challenges that reflected changes in  
social beliefs. The Cruzan Court dealt with the difficult decision of 
two parents to possibly terminate the life-prolonging treatment of 
their daughter, who was in a permanent vegetative state. 157  The 
Court found that there was a protected liberty interest in the private 
determination to refuse medical treatment.158 
 Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed privacy con-
cerns surrounding homosexuality in Lawrence v. Texas. The Court 
held a Texas statute that made particular private sexual acts illegal, 
and which was used to prosecute homosexual males, was unconstitu-
tional.159 These cases show that Supreme Court privacy considera-
tions are broadened or narrowed in response to changes in society 
and American culture as a whole, whether those changes are due to 
advances in women’s rights, complications due to advancements in 
medical care and technology, or wider societal acceptance of same-sex 
relationships.160 The most consequential cultural change reflected in 
modern privacy rights is, of course, tied to the invention and prolifera-
tion of personal computers and the internet, and the explosion of digi-
tal data, information, and websites created through the linkage of each. 
B.   Modern Privacy Rights and Personal Data 
 The rapid introduction of new technologies and the conversion of 
physically recorded information into digital data has resulted in un-
foreseen privacy concerns being brought before the Supreme Court. 
The ease with which information, particularly private data from per-
sonal devices, can be recorded and accessed today can result in in-
formation recovered from criminal suspects, yet not admissible in 
court. The “exclusionary rule,” which bars prosecutors from submit-
ting illegally obtained evidence in court, is a judicial doctrine used to 
deter Fourth Amendment violations.161 Under the exclusionary rule, 
                                                                                                                       
 154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 155. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 156. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 157. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266. 
 158. Id. at 278. 
 159. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
 160. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598-99 (2015). 
 161. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011). 
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any evidence derived from an improper, warrantless invasion of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be admitted into evi-
dence at trial against them.162 Warrantless searches of a suspect that 
take place during an arrest, however, are not subject to the exclu-
sionary rule, so long as the search is lawful and limited to the ar-
restee’s person and the surrounding area “within his immediate con-
trol.”163 According to the Supreme Court, warrantless searches are 
permissible outside of the arrestee’s person only to cover “the area 
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence.”164 The Court emphasizes the twin risks of poten-
tial harm to an officer and the opportunity for destruction of evidence 
as the foundational justifications for why such a search may not vio-
late an individual’s constitutional rights.165 These principal risks be-
come problematic, however, when assessing evidence and personal 
information that is digital, not physical in nature. 
 1.   Addressing the Evolving Nature of the Right to Privacy 
 In an environment where judges and courts often struggle to keep 
up with rapidly developing technologies, it can be difficult to determine 
when a warrantless search is subject to the exclusionary rule because 
of shifts in the Supreme Court’s position that affect the admissibility of 
evidence in a pending case. The 2011 case, Davis v. United States,166 
involved a warrantless search that was compliant with then-existing 
Supreme Court precedent when the search was conducted.167 Under 
the 1981 precedent of New York v. Belton,168 the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle was a permissible place for a police officer to search 
when making a lawful custodial arrest of vehicle passengers.169 How-
ever, in 2009, the Court decided Arizona v. Gant,170 in which the Court 
declined a broad reading of Belton.171 Instead, the Court created a two-
part rule that determined whether the search of a vehicle was unrea-
sonable, and thus unconstitutional, based on whether the arrestee 
could reach items in the search area and whether the police had rea-
son to believe that there was evidence in the searched area related to 
                                                                                                                       
 162. Id. at 231-32. 
 163. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Davis, 564 U.S. 229. 
 167. Id. at 235. 
 168. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 169. Id. at 462-63. 
 170. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 171. Id. at 348. 
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the crime for which the individual was being arrested.172 Due to the 
timing of the appeal process in Davis, the warrantless search in ques-
tion was lawful under Belton when it was conducted, yet unlawful at 
the time of appeal due to the newly defined rule in Gant.173 The Davis 
Court decided that when the police conduct a search which is reasona-
ble and therefore legal at the time of the search, under governing case 
law, the exclusionary rule does not apply.174 As technology and juris-
prudence continue to evolve and courts respond via individual judicial 
decisions, modern privacy protections will likely develop in relation to 
technological evolution. 
 2.   Modern Technology and Privacy Protection 
 In 2014, the Supreme Court addressed privacy issues surrounding 
one of the most ubiquitous pieces of technology in modern society, the 
cell phone. In Riley v. California,175 the Court was presented with the 
consolidation of two separate appellate cases, both involving evidence 
that had been obtained from the defendant’s cell phone through a 
warrantless search.176 In order to determine whether to allow a par-
ticular type of warrantless search, the Court generally weighs the 
degree of intrusion on the individual’s privacy against how necessary 
the search is to further a legitimate governmental interest.177  
 In recognition of the fundamental difference between physical ob-
jects and digital data, the Court declined to extend the categorical rule 
found in United States v. Robinson,178 a pre-cell phone case from 1973 
where the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of a sus-
pect arrested in the course of a traffic stop was a permissible intrusion 
under the Fourth Amendment.179 The Robinson Court acknowledged 
that the lawful intrusion of personal rights incident to arrest did not 
alone permit any additional intrusion on the suspect’s personal priva-
cy,180 following the precedent set four years earlier by Chimel v. Cali-
fornia.181 The Court did, however, find another justification for such a 
warrantless search: “The justification or reason for the authority to 
search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to 
                                                                                                                       
 172. Id. at 343. 
 173. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 235-36 (2011). 
 174. Id. at 249-50. 
 175. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 176. Id. at 2480. 
 177. Id. at 2484 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 178. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 179. Id. at 235-36. 
 180. Id. at 225-26. 
 181. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the 
need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial.”182 
 The Supreme Court in Riley distinguished Robinson by noting 
that the risks presented by physical objects during an arrest were 
absent when dealing with cell phone searches; in other words, cell-
phone data could not threaten the arresting officer or risk the de-
struction of potential evidence in the same way that physical items 
could.183 Justice Roberts, writing the opinion for the Court, noted that 
unlike physical searches, cellphone searches “place vast quantities of 
personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”184 Follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s tradition of defining privacy rights within 
the context of social norms, Riley represents the Court’s recognition 
that a cell phone represents a distinct class of item, different and far 
more valued than other personal items.185 People have evolved to lit-
erally love their cell phones,186 which makes this type of privacy pro-
tection crucial to the protection of personal privacy, as delineated by 
future cases.187 
 3.   Constitutional Protection for Personal Data 
 As for personal data, the Constitution, as currently interpreted, 
does little to protect consumers from the aggregation of information 
that they have disclosed to corporate actors. The third-party doctrine, 
as seen in cases like United States v. Miller188 and Smith v. Mary-
land, 189  insulates companies that accumulate and combine infor-
mation.190 In Miller, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms (ATF) obtained evidence through subpoenas issued to the de-
fendant’s banks.191 Without notice to or approval from their client 
(Miller), the banks turned over the desired bank records to the gov-
                                                                                                                       
 182. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. 
 183. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014). 
 184. Id. at 2485. 
 185. See id. at 2488-91 (discussing the many ways that cell phones are different from 
other items someone carries in their pockets, other types of records, and other information 
containers). 
 186. See, e.g., Martin Lindstrom, You Love Your iPhone. Literally., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/opinion/you-love-your-iphone-literally.html? 
mcubz=0. 
 187. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court to Settle Major Cellphone Privacy 
Case, REUTERS (June 5, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-mobilephone/u-s-
supreme-court-to-settle-major-cellphone-privacy-case-idUSKBN18W1RY [https://perma.cc/ 
845E-Z84H?type=image]. 
 188. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 189. 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
 190. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43. 
 191. Id. at 437. 
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ernment, including deposit slips and personal checks.192 The Supreme 
Court determined that no Fourth Amendment interests were impli-
cated because when someone—such as an individual making deposits 
at a bank—willingly offers up his personal information to a third par-
ty, he “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the in-
formation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”193 In 
response, legislation was passed shortly afterwards in the form of the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,194 which codified a right to pro-
tection of one’s personal financial records.195 Outside of such formalized 
rights, however, offering information to third parties can explicitly 
surrender an individual’s privacy interest in that information. Once 
that claim of ownership has been apparently relinquished, third parties 
may legitimately utilize that information or even sell it to others.196 
 Intuitively, people tend to believe that their personal information 
and intimate facts about them belong to them. 197  However, once 
shared, third-party nongovernmental entities may also have a right 
to use, exploit, or sell that information. According to the Supreme 
Court, “private decisionmaking can avoid governmental partiality 
and thus insulate privacy measures from First Amendment  
challenge.”198 In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,199 Vermont’s Prescription 
Confidentiality Law,200 which put limitations on the sale and use of 
prescription records, was challenged as unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment by data miners and pharmaceutical companies.201 
Apparently, it is routine practice for pharmacies and insurers to sell 
prescriber-identifying information to data miners, including infor-
mation that pharmacies are required by federal law to record and 
save when filling prescriptions.202 The state statute attempted to curb 
this behavior by making the legality of selling, licensing, or exchang-
ing prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes con-
                                                                                                                       
 192. Id. at 438. 
 193. Id. at 443. 
 194. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012). 
 195. Id. § 3402. 
 196. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011). 
 197. See generally MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10 (discussing how Americans showed 
overwhelming preferences for controlling who has their information, as well as what hap-
pens to it). 
 198. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 573. 
 199. Id. at 552. 
 200. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2010). The law prohibited the sale or use of regulat-
ed prescription records kept by doctors, pharmacies, insurers, and employers for marketing 
purposes without the prescribing doctors’ permission. Id. 
 201. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 561.  
 202. Id. at 558. 
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tingent on first obtaining the prescriber’s permission.203 The Vermont 
legislature strictly narrowed the scope of the prohibition to the use 
for marketing purposes, while permitting prescribers to freely dis-
close information under the statute for research, compliance, or law 
enforcement purposes—even to pharmaceutical companies and mar-
keters—as long as they did not then use the records for marketing.204 
The Court rejected this approach of relying on private actors—in this 
case, prescribing doctors—to serve as the gateway for sensitive in-
formation disclosure in order to limit a specific use of it, and the state 
law was found unconstitutional.205  The Court sustained the lower 
court’s ruling, 206  which held that the Vermont law burdened the 
commercial speech rights of data miners and marketers under the 
First Amendment.207 Data mining and other legitimate exercises of 
commercial speech rights, like those in Sorrell,208 can significantly 
complicate and undermine individual privacy rights, especially when 
personal information is freely given to third parties in exchange for 
goods or services.209  
 In 2011, in NASA v. Nelson, individuals brought suit after being 
required to submit personal information for a background check,  
under penalty of termination, to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) as part of their contractual employment with 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.210 While the Court took notice of the 
potential threat to individual privacy created by the accumulation of 
personal information, the opinion noted that as explained in previous 
decisions, a legally imposed duty to keep compiled information secure 
was generally sufficient to address privacy implications.211 The Court 
                                                                                                                       
 203. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010). The state legislature passed the law based 
on findings that pharmaceutical companies were tailoring their marketing and targeting 
them at particular doctors largely based on these types of records, and that the pharma-
ceutical marketing programs have goals directly opposed to the state’s interest in effective 
and affordable prescribing practices. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 560-61. 
 204. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 580.  
 205. Id. The data miners and pharmaceutical companies argued, and the Court agreed, 
that their free speech was burdened by the law, based on its content and their identity, which 
are particularly problematic in the context of burdens on First Amendment rights. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 208. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 553, 558. 
 209. Commercial “free speech” and corporate assertions of First Amendment rights 
have severely curtailed and complicated individuals’ rights to privacy, speech, and even 
health, safety, and welfare, as the government’s ability to regulate commerce has been 
undermined and confined by Supreme Court decisions, such as Sorrell, over the last sever-
al decades. See generally TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COM-
MERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012). 
 210. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138-39 (2011). 
 211. Id. at 155-56. 
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looked at two decisions from thirty years prior that discussed a pri-
vacy right in avoiding the disclosure of personal information.212 In 
Whalen v. Roe,213 decided in February of 1977, the State of New York 
accumulated a record of names and addresses of anyone who had been 
prescribed certain medications that were known also to be traded in 
the illegal market.214 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, wrote: 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accu-
mulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized 
data banks or other massive government files. The collection of 
taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the 
supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, 
and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly 
preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is 
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public  
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or 
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing 
that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the 
Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its 
implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper con-
cern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy.215 
This issue again appeared before the Court just four months later in 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.216 Referencing Whalen, 
the Court in Nixon again asserted that a constitutional right exists 
that protects individuals from unwillingly disclosing private, person-
al information.217 In 2011, the Supreme Court, after reviewing these 
two cases, held that the particular background check at issue in Nel-
son218 did not violate any constitutional privacy right, especially in 
                                                                                                                       
 212. Id. at 138. 
 213. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 214. Id. at 591. 
 215. Id. at 605 (footnote omitted). The Court held that the burden imposed by the po-
tential public disclosure of private health information due to negligence (improper securi-
ty), need (judicial proceeding), or intention (voluntary disclosure via prescription forms), on 
“either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom Schedule II drugs are med-
ically indicated is [in]sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 603-04. 
 216. 433 U.S. 425, 425 (1977). 
 217. Id. at 458. The Court, considering the records of the Nixon Administration, found 
that while the former president had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal 
communications, such as those with his family, doctor, and lawyers, President Nixon’s 
status as a public figure, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of the records were 
very much of public concern and related to his presidency, negated his privacy claim relat-
ing to the process of screening by government archivists of private information from the 
general disclosure. Id. at 461-65. 
 218. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 159 (2011). 
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the face of the government’s interests as an employer and the protec-
tions provided under the Privacy Act of 1974.219 
 The Supreme Court did at least contemplate a right to informa-
tional privacy: “We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution 
protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nix-
on.”220 In the future, constitutional rights concerning personal data 
will inevitably become more and more important and complex as new 
and increasingly intrusive forms of information are being analyzed 
and relied on by both public and private entities and, therefore, in 
courts of law. For example, the Supreme Court found that swabbing 
arrestees for DNA samples in order to analyze and compare them 
against a database of samples, for identification purposes, did not 
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.221 As the volume and va-
riety of data being recorded, analyzed, and stored continues to expand, 
the threat to individual and personal privacy grows concurrently, in-
tensifying the demand for implementation of both traditional protec-
tions—such as legislation and regulations—and more modern and 
novel protections conceivably provided by corporate and private actors. 
IV.   REGULATING BIG DATA 
 There are a number of federal laws which apply to personal data, 
though few, if any, reach the realm of big data and the activities of 
data brokers. Since the passing of the Privacy Act in 1974, which 
governs and limits the disclosure of personal information by the gov-
ernment,222 various legislation has been enacted that regulates the 
collection and use of personal data both by the public and private sec-
tors. Generally, the security of information collected by the govern-
ment is assured by federal law through the Federal Information Se-
curity Management Act (FISMA), which provides that federal agen-
cies and entities, including government contractors, must implement 
                                                                                                                       
 219. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Nelson, 562 U.S. at 138. The Privacy Act authorizes the 
federal government to keep records on individuals only when “relevant and necessary” for a 
mandated purpose and bars the government from disclosing records on an individual with-
out that individual’s written consent. Id. at 142; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e). 
 220. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 138. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, noted, however, 
that the Court had not fully considered or affirmed the right to “informational privacy” 
outside of Whalen and Nixon, which has been defined as the “individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 146 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599). 
 221. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013). As the Court notes in this case, “[a]ll 
50 States require the collection of DNA from felony convicts.” Id. at 445. The Court also 
held that the government has a legitimate and strong interest in confirming a person’s 
identity, and that persons taken into police custody, despite not yet being convicted or even 
officially charged, have an obviously diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 462-63. 
 222. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
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and deploy security provisions.223 The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, through its FISMA Implementation Project, devel-
ops the rules and regulations for information security and categoriza-
tion, and provides guidance on necessary security features and sys-
tems required under the statute.224 
A.   Protection for Specific Types of Information 
 Many federal statutes identify certain kinds of personal infor-
mation that Congress has classified as necessary to protect, such as 
data concerning susceptible classes of people (like children) and high-
ly sensitive information (like bank or health records). The Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects the privacy 
rights of students by giving parents certain rights over the education 
records of their children.225 As for financial information, the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, originally passed as a reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller,226 creates protections for 
bank and financial records.227 However, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA), passed in 1999, does permit financial institutions to disclose 
personal information to affiliated third parties.228 Where identifiable 
personal data, like names, telephone numbers, and social security 
numbers, are associated with health information, the activity falls 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA).229 Promulgated under HIPAA, the Privacy Rule and 
                                                                                                                       
 223. See 44 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012). 
 224. See 40 U.S.C. § 11331 (2012); see also Risk Management—Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) Implementation Project, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & 
TECH., http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/index.html [https://perma.cc/SV6H-BGPU] 
(last updated Jan. 8, 2018). 
 225. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). Notably, FERPA also covers college campus medical 
records, and is often less protective than HIPAA. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JOINT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY EDU-
CATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) AND THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) TO STUDENT HEALTH RECORDS 1-2 (2008). 
 226. 425 U.S. 435, 1624 (1976) (holding that there was no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in personal checks and deposit slips because they were voluntarily shared with the 
bank and its employees and were therefore business, not personal, records). The Court held 
that the requirement of recordkeeping of checks and deposits by the banks did not negate 
the voluntary sharing of such information, and therefore, did not create a privacy interest 
in such records. Id.; see also supra Section III.B.3. 
 227. See 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012). 
 228. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). The GLBA requires banks to provide notice and opt-
out provisions to consumers, as part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2012), but exempts certain disclosures, including those related to customer service and 
marketing by the institution. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(d). 
 229. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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the Security Rule230 apply to Protected Health Information, which 
includes information regarding treatment, status, provider, and 
payments.231 The rules outline necessary protections for this sensitive 
data, whether it is stored physically or electronically.232 
 1.   The Collection and Recording of Emails 
 Formally, the collection and use of email addresses are regulated 
and limited by applicable federal statutes. The Controlling the  
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2013 
(CAN-SPAM Act)233 was intended to suppress the inundation of bulk 
commercial email communications. 234  The FTC notes that beyond 
spam,235 the CAN-SPAM Act applies to commercial emails more broad-
ly, including intra-business messages and emailed notices announcing 
new products.236 However, the Act has been widely criticized for not 
only being ineffective but also for preempting more potent state law 
that could have been enacted absent the federal law.237 The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) also addresses email protection, 
outlining certain requirements related to search warrants for stored 
electronic communications; 238 however, the ECPA is seriously outdat-
ed239 and has been further weakened by significant amendments, such 
as the Patriot Act240 and its reauthorizations.241 
                                                                                                                       
 230. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (2016) (Security Rule); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016) (Privacy 
Rule) (2017); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HIPAA ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION, REGULATION TEXT, 45 CFR PARTS 160, 162, AND 
164 (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/ 
hipaa-simplification-201303.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSD9-C8KD].  
 231. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 232. See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 164. 
 233. Pub L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713, 18 
U.S.C. § 1037 (2012)). 
 234. See Definitions and Implementation Under the CAN-SPAM Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
29,654 (May 21, 2008) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 316) (noting that the Act was intended to 
create “tools to combat commercial email that is unwanted by the recipient and/or decep-
tive”); FTC, THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 1-2 (2009). 
 235. Spam is generally defined as unsolicited, commercial emails that are sent to a large 
number of recipients. See Spam, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/spam [https://perma.cc/8677-5LS3]. 
 236. See THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR BUSINESS, supra note 234. 
 237. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Comment, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Fed-
eral CAN-SPAM Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2005); Jay Reyero, Comment, The 
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: A False Hope, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 195, 195 (2007) (“In-
stead of protecting consumers, it protects commercial marketers; instead of focusing on 
‘unsolicited’ email, it focuses on ‘deceptive’ email; instead of tackling the problem, it shifts 
the burden to others; instead of creating a strong legal foundation when preemption occurs, 
it creates a weak national standard that usurps stronger state initiatives.”). 
 238. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012). 
 239. The ECPA was passed in 1986 and has therefore largely weakened privacy protec-
tions of emails stored on third-party servers, despite the fact that it is now common prac-
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 2.   Information Relating to Credit Transactions 
 Where data firms are advising companies on consumer transac-
tions, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),242 as amended by the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA),243 applies. The 
FCRA governs consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) based on their 
intricate and inextricable role in commerce.244 The FACTA requires 
CRAs to “adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of com-
merce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other infor-
mation in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with 
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utiliza-
tion of such information.”245 The Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs), established by the FTC, reflect the agency’s interpretation of 
what types of activities correspond to reasonable procedures among 
CRAs. 246  The FIPPs focus are on the principles of notice, choice,  
access, security, and enforcement for interpreting, regulating, and 
constraining CRAs behavior.247 Also, the FACTA features additional 
safeguards for identity theft, such as requirements to maintain and dis-
close to the consumer upon request files for fraud-related incidents.248 
 3.   Identity Theft 
 The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 (ITA-
DA)249 made identity theft250 a federal offense.251 The ITADA amended 
                                                                                                                  
tice to store one’s personal emails online, such as on servers owned by companies like 
Google. See Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun By the Web, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/10privacy.html?hp. 
 240. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
 241. See USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006). See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL 
EDUC., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2009). 
 242. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 243. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 1681-1681x (2012)). 
 244. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a). CRAs play a significant role in “investigating and evaluating 
the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general reputation of 
consumers,” and consumer access to the banking system is fundamental to participating in 
the economy. See id. 
 245. Id. § 1681(b). 
 246. See FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998); FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000) [hereinafter FTC 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES]. 
 247. See FTC, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 246. 
 248. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (2012). 
 249. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012). 
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the federal criminal law to make it a crime when someone “knowing-
ly transfers, possesses, or uses . . . a means of identification of anoth-
er person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful 
activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law or . . . a felony.”252 
The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (ITPEA) offered an  
aggravated version of the crime, which strengthened the consequenc-
es for specific, enumerated felonies, including mail, bank, and wire 
fraud; obtaining customer information by false pretenses; and mak-
ing false statements pertaining to social security benefits.253 Addi-
tionally, the ITPEA outlined even stronger sentencing for acts relat-
ing to terrorism.254 According to the FBI, identify theft complaints 
more than doubled between 2010 and 2015, and the “number of iden-
tity theft victims and total losses are likely much higher than  
publicly-reported statistics.”255 
B.   Transparency and Access to Information 
Held by the Government 
 To increase government transparency, some federal regulations, 
however, enable access to information collected and stored by the 
government. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides an av-
enue for individuals to access information held by governmental 
agencies.256 With a few exceptions,257 FOIA requires federal agencies 
                                                                                                                  
 250. In the context of federal criminal law, the crime of “identity theft” is defined 
broadly to include possessing, using, or selling false identification, identification of another 
person, identity authentication features, unauthorized or stolen identification, or equip-
ment for creating false identification, or attempting to do any of the above. Id. § 1028(a)(7). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) (2012). Someone convicted of aggravated identity theft 
will have a mandatory two-year prison sentence added to whatever other sentencing the 
court may impose for related crimes. Id. § 1028A(a)(1). In addition to those listed above, 
the aggravated form of identity theft was also tied to crimes related to citizenship, immi-
gration, passports, and firearm acquisition. Id. § 1028A(c)(2)-(3), (6)-(7), (9)-(10). 
 254. Id. § 1028A(a)(2). Someone convicted of an act of terrorism who commits identity 
theft in connection with that act will have a mandatory five-year prison sentence added to 
whatever other sentencing the court imposes. Id. 
 255. Identity Theft, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/identity-
theft [https://perma.cc/P89A-39VV]. The FBI notes that identity thieves use a variety of 
sensitive information to commit fraud, including: names, Social Security numbers, dates of 
birth, Medicare numbers, addresses, birth certificates, death certificates, passport num-
bers, financial account numbers, passwords, telephone numbers, and biometric data such 
as fingerprints. Id. 
 256. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 257. Id. § 552(e)(1)-(9). The exceptions are for things such as trade secrets, privileged 
or confidential information, internal memoranda, personnel and medical data, and classi-
fied information. Id. 
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to disclose records upon request by the public.258 Anyone may request  
records; although, agencies are not required to collect information 
outside out of their records or reorganize data in response to a re-
quest nor are the requests free. 259  Due to the breadth of certain  
exceptions,260 the records produced under FOIA may only provide a 
narrow window of access to the personal information of others; hence, 
marketers’ need for data brokers.261 Once a private actor has acquired 
that data, however, it may become available to other sources or com-
piled with other information, permitting analysis that can expose 
identifying and sensitive information by combining multiple sources 
of data.262  
 Recently, this exact issue made headlines when two major events 
occurred. The first, reported in December 2015, was that a database 
of seemingly every voter in the United States, including names, 
birthdates, addresses, phone numbers, party affiliations, and voting 
history, was discovered to be available on the internet, completely 
unsecured. 263  The second event occurred following the election of 
Donald Trump in 2016 when the President established the Presiden-
tial Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Commission) to in-
vestigate improper and fraudulent voting. 264  The Commission re-
                                                                                                                       
 258. Id. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
 259. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i); Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guide-
lines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012 (Mar. 27, 1987). Under FOIA, its amendments, and related 
caselaw, there are three classes of requesters (commercial, educational/scientific/media, 
and everyone else), and three types of fees (search, review, duplication). Id. at 10,012-16. 
However, for noncommercial requesters, agencies are required to provide the first 100 pag-
es of duplication and the first 2 hours of search time free of charge, and there are waivers 
available for requests that are in the public interest. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(II); see also 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: FEES AND FEE WAIV-
ERS (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/fees-feewaivers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W67C-XBMG]. 
 260. For example, there are exceptions to FOIA requests for information that is “specif-
ically exempted from disclosure by statute,” commonly referred to as Exemption 3 statutes, 
and exceptions for information that “constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (6); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUTES FOUND TO QUALIFY 
UNDER EXEMPTION 3 OF THE FOIA (2016) (listing more than seventy statutes that courts 
have found qualify under Exemption 3); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 6, at 417-20, 454-56 (2014) (discussing the balancing test 
of the privacy interest versus the public interest in determining which information is cov-
ered by Exemption 6, by either being an invasion of personal privacy or contained in per-
sonnel, medical, or similar types of files).  
 261. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.  
 262. See discussion supra Section II.B.4. 
 263. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, 191 Million US Voter Registration Records Leaked in 
Mystery Database, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2015, 8:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
thomasbrewster/2015/12/28/us-voter-database-leak/#676a193c5b98. 
 264. Exec. Order. No. 13,799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 16, 2017) (establishing the Presi-
dential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity); see also Presidential Advisory Commission 
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quested a vast array of voter roll information from all fifty states, in-
cluding the last four digits of voters’ social security numbers, permit-
ting the federal government to create a national database. 265  The  
aggregation of this sensitive identifying data is concerning to many 
privacy experts because of the risk of the bulk information being  
stolen or leaked.266 Clearly, governmental transparency as afforded 
by FOIA and similar state and local laws,267 while certainly positive 
for democracy, creates a broad source of potentially identifying per-
sonal information that can be utilized by individuals and data  
brokers alike.268 As far back as 2007, the risk of the combination of 
voter information with other, more commercial data to create vast 
databases was well-known and publicly concerning.269 A decade later, 
the fact that these databases have only become larger and less secure 
bolsters the need for explicit solutions to the exponential growth of 
the aggregation of personal information. 
                                                                                                                  
on Election Integrity, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (July 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse gov/blog/ 
2017/07/13/presidential-advisory-commission-election-integrity [https://perma.cc/R5WR-7ARG].  
 265. See, e.g., Jessica Huseman, Presidential Commission Demands Massive Amounts 
of State Voter Data, PROPUBLICA (June 29, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/presidential-commission-demands-massive-amounts-of-state-voter-data [https://perma.cc/ 
VH9N-MSZ7]. The social security numbers, in particular, were seen by states as being non-
public, and therefore, most states refused the request. See Liz Stark & Grace Hauck, Forty-
Four States and DC Have Refused to Give Certain Voter Information to Trump Commis-
sion, CNN (July 5, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/03/politics/kris-kobach-letter-voter-
fraud-commission-information/index.html [https://perma.cc/VWP5-HC2S]. 
 266. See Issie Lapowsky, Trump Wants All Your Voter Data. What Could Go Wrong?, 
WIRED (June 30, 2017, 6:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/trump-wants-all-your-voter-
data-what-could-go-wrong [https://perma.cc/YE79-SYDZ] (“Aggregating the voter rolls from 
many states creates a bigger privacy risk than the patchwork of state data we have  
today . . . .” (quoting Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, Elec. Frontier Found., Senior Staff Technologist)). 
 267. For example, much of the voter information requested by the Election Commission 
is publicly available, depending on the state. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.0525(3)(b) (2017); 
Voter Information as a Public Record, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, http://dos.myflorida.com/ 
elections/for-voters/voter-registration/voter-information-as-a-public-record [https://perma.cc/ 
7GAY-8CEZ]. 
 268. See James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR (Dec. 2007), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/12/aristotle200712 [https://perma.cc/LLB6-TS53] 
(discussing the political data broker, Aristotle, who sells huge amounts of voter infor-
mation, consisting of both public and commercial data, to politicians and others). See gen-
erally discussion supra Part II.  
 269. Verini, supra note 268. The founder of the political data broker, Aristotle, regard-
ing the use of this data to target specific individuals, was quoted as saying:  
I happen to think the rights of the speaker, in the case of political speech, and for 
the good of society, outweigh the rights of the recipient. . . . The benefits of allow-
ing unfettered debate, even requiring people to hear positions they don’t want to 
hear, outweigh the right of the person to say, “I don’t want to hear this.” 
Id.  
2017]  GUARDIANS OF THE GALAXY 295 
 
 
V.   SOLUTIONS TO THE BIG DATA THREAT 
 Like the FTC, the White House, scholars, and journalists have 
noted there are serious potential and realized dangers associated 
with the ubiquity of the aggregation and use of big data.270 While it 
seems that the use of big data in both the private and public sectors 
will continue, if not expand, in the future,271 there are numerous po-
tential solutions which can help safeguard personal privacy. Consti-
tutional rights to personal information can be insufficient to protect 
against these threats, 272  and potential federal legislation, though 
promising, may be difficult to pass in the current political climate.273 
In addition to legislative efforts, the burden will fall to governmental 
agencies (through their rulemaking and enforcement activities) and 
even corporate actors (through their consumer and business practic-
es) to safeguard personal data.274 In order to address big data con-
cerns, the executive branch should implement more aggressive regu-
lation, which is possible even under existing federal authority,275 and 
Congress should pass legislation expanding the scope of federal agen-
cies’ power to regulate the movement of information, particularly re-
lated to commercial efforts. On the private sector side of the equa-
tion, a corporate right to privacy276 could help ensure the privacy 
rights of individuals and theoretically protect against governmental 
intrusion. 277  Similarly, market-based approaches, such as privacy 
                                                                                                                       
 270. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 271. See BIG DATA OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15; Kim Zetter, Voter Privacy Is Gone—
Get Over It, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2008, 9:18 AM), https://www.wired.com/2008/01/voter-privacy-i 
[https://perma.cc/C42A-R3P3]. 
 272. See discussion supra Part III. 
 273. See Andy Greenberg, Congress Has a Thing or Two to Learn from These State 
Privacy Laws, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2016/01/26/electronic_communications_privacy_act_is_due_for_an_upgr
ade.html [https://perma.cc/AJQ6-D4QF?type=image] (discussing how the eternal gridlock 
in Congress has caused states to try to respond to the growing privacy concerns with their 
own legislation); see also discussion infra Section V.A.2. 
 274. Companies are known to cultivate their public image and therefore the public’s 
goodwill by protecting their customers’ privacy, even in the face of governmental re-
quests for data. See, e.g., Will Oremus, Apple vs. the FBI, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE  
(Feb. 17, 2016, 7:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02/ 
apple_s_stand_against_the_fbi_is_courageous_it_s_also_good_for_apple.html [https://perma.cc/ 
A65R-GX7Z?type=image] (arguing that Apple decided to take a stand against the FBI, even 
in a case involving terrorism, as an attempt to portray the company as being especially 
protective of their users’ privacy). 
 275. See discussion infra Section V.A.1. 
 276. See discussion infra Section V.B.1. 
 277. See, e.g., Kayla Robinson, Note, Corporate Rights and Individual Interests: The 
Corporate Right to Privacy as a Bulwark Against Warrantless Government Surveillance, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2296 (2015) (discussing the positive aspects of a corporate right to 
privacy, particularly when the right is linked to being good for the public interest). Because 
so much of our data is held by corporations, and because the Supreme Court has held that 
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protection services,278 could assist individuals in ensuring their own 
personal information is and stays secure. 
A.   Solutions from the Public Sector 
 The FTC has the authority to investigate and prosecute companies 
that participate in unfair or deceptive behavior that has an effect on 
commerce in the United States.279 Specifically, under section 5(a) of 
the FTC Act, the FTC is authorized and directed to prevent corpora-
tions “from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce.”280 More aggressive regulation on the part of agencies like the 
FTC could help deter individual privacy intrusions when constitu-
tional protections fail to do so. Expanding the regulatory impact of 
such agencies, by growing their regulations to the extent permissible 
by law, would also allow them to better deal with the ongoing threat 
of data aggregation and the use of big data. 
 1.   Regulating Within Existing Authority 
 Some legal experts have suggested that one pathway to address-
ing the threat of big data to individual privacy is already open to the 
federal government. In a 2015 law review article, Professors Wood-
row Hartzog and Daniel Solove posited that recent cases have ex-
posed the ambiguity of the FTC’s authority.281 Hartzog and Solove 
argue that the FTC “not only has the authority to regulate data pro-
tection to the extent it has been doing, but that it also has the  
authority to expand its reach much more.”282 The authors contend 
that the broad domain of authority granted through the FTC Act283 
includes the authority to pursue violations beyond the type of blatant 
infractions normally investigated and prioritized by the agency.284 
                                                                                                                  
sharing information with third parties “surrenders” one’s right to privacy of that infor-
mation, corporations may be in the best position to protect our information. Id. 
 278. Companies have emerged that scan the internet for a customer’s information and 
attempt to purge information where possible. See discussion infra Section V.B.2. 
 279. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). The FTC’s authority to find practices unfair or decep-
tive is intentionally broad to permit the FTC’s jurisdiction to evolve with time. See FTC, 
FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8K2-NM7G]. 
 280. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
 281. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Pro-
tection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015). 
 282. Id. at 2232. 
 283. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(21). 
 284. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 281, at 2266 (arguing that the FTC’s enforcement 
strategy makes them more “a norm-codifier than a norm-maker”). 
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Further, the authors argue that not only does the FTC have “great 
potential to regulate data protection with the appropriate nuance and 
focus,”285 but that it should be exercising its existing authority much 
more robustly.286 
 There have been several successes in federal regulation which  
exemplify the possibility of more aggressive regulation not just for 
the FTC, but for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as 
well. In 2016, for example, the FCC settled with Verizon for $1.35 
million over the company’s use of tracking cookies without notifying 
its customers or providing customers with any choices about their 
data.287 In 2008, the FTC settled with a credit card company that 
failed to disclose its use of big data, which reflected a practice of  
associative discrimination by presuming heightened risk based on 
similarities between customer spending habits.288 In 2016, the FTC 
also settled with the data broker LeapLab in response to allegations 
that the company (along with others) had sold sensitive information, 
including banking records and social security numbers, to third par-
ties without customer consent.289 Both the FCC and the FTC have 
demonstrated the authority and the ability to go after companies that 
abuse big data and personal information. However, whether the FCC 
and FTC are fully able and willing to take similar or more aggressive 
actions in the future is yet to be seen. 
 2.   Expanding Regulation 
 In response to wider public knowledge of big data concerns, there 
are numerous federal and state laws pending across the nation in 
addition to numerous public- and private-action plans that deal with 
                                                                                                                       
 285. Id. at 2299. 
 286. Id. at 2266. Because of rapidly evolving technologies, the clear inability of Con-
gress to pass privacy legislation, and the growing harms caused by big data, the authors 
argue that the FTC is “one of the best hopes for guiding U.S. privacy law to a more coher-
ent and stable regulatory system.” Id. 
 287. Press Release, FCC, FCC Settles Verizon “Supercookie” Probe, Requires Consum-
er Opt-In for Third Parties (Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter FCC Settles Verizon], 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-338091A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NRM-
D9F3] (summarizing the FCC’s enforcement that included requiring Verizon to inform 
users of their data tracking practices and to permit users to opt-in and even limit who their 
data can be shared with). 
 288. DATA EXCLUSION, supra note 34, at 9-10 (citing FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 
1:08-cv-1976-BBM-RGV (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2008)). 
 289. Press Release, FTC, Data Broker Defendants Settle FTC Charges They Sold Sen-
sitive Personal Information to Scammers (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2016/02/data-broker-defendants-settle-ftc-charges-they-sold-sensitive 
[https://perma.cc/T8KZ-22AM] (summarizing the case, which included findings that 
LeapLab sold this sensitive information to scammers and telemarketers, who then stole 
millions from these customers). 
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big data issues.290 In 2012, the Obama Administration announced its 
Big Data Research and Development Initiative, 291  which involved 
more than $200 million in new commitments to improve big data 
techniques among federal agencies.292 Following the 2015 passage of 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA)293 (which received 
mixed reviews by privacy activists294), President Obama announced 
the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, which is meant to both build 
a long-term strategy to identify, monitor, and address cybersecurity 
issues, as well as increase public awareness of cybersecurity issues.295 
Although it is still unclear what position the Trump Administration 
will pursue, the passage of CISA shows that the government will con-
tinue to rely on, and even increase its dependence on, big data  
analytical tools.296 
 One seemingly simple solution to the threat of big data is to  
directly address the problem by passing new legislation that more 
accurately reflects the state of technology in modern America. Unfor-
tunately, this avenue to improve personal data protection can be  
politically divisive, time intensive, and technically difficult, despite 
being the traditional method of effecting policy.297 On March 4, 2015, 
Senators Ed Markey, Richard Blumenthal, Sheldon Whitehouse, and 
                                                                                                                       
 290. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 273. 
 291. Tom Kalil, Big Data is a Big Deal, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Mar. 29, 2012, 9:23 AM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/29/big-data-big-deal [https://perma.cc/3CXZ-MUH5]. 
 292. Id. It remains to be seen if the Trump Administration will continue any of these 
programs, but recent activities have raised doubts. See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, As Congress 
Repeals Internet Privacy Rules, Putting Your Options in Perspective, NPR (Mar. 28,  
2017, 6:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/03/28/521813464/as-
congress-repeals-internet-privacy-rules-putting-your-options-in-perspective (describing a 
bill passed by Congress and eventually signed into law by the president that repealed a 
rule passed by the Obama Administration in 2016 that gave consumers more control over 
how their Internet Service Providers use and share their information). 
 293. S.754, 114th Cong. (as passed by the Senate, Oct. 27, 2015). 
 294. See Andrea Peterson, Senate Passes Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bill De-
spite Privacy Fears, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-switch/wp/2015/10/27/senate-passes-controversial-cybersecurity-information-sharing-
legislation [https://perma.cc/ZA4X-GVCB] (noting that privacy activists saw the bill’s in-
formation-sharing provisions as a “backdoor surveillance bill”). 
 295. Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Cybersecurity National Ac-
tion Plan, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan [https://perma.cc/ 
JFT4-JP4V] (outlining such initiatives as creating the Commission on Enhancing National 
Cybersecurity, modernizing government information technology practices, encouraging 
multi-factor authentication, and investing more federal revenue into cybersecurity). 
 296. See Peterson, supra note 294 (noting the law’s encouragement of sharing big data 
to improve security practices and systems). 
 297. See Jonathan Weisman, In Congress, Gridlock and Harsh Consequences, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/politics/in-congress-gridlock-
and-harsh-consequences.html. 
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Al Franken introduced a bill called the Data Broker Accountability 
and Transparency Act.298 The bill was referred to the Senate Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation Committee, but had a very low 
chance of being enacted at the time, and in fact did not pass either 
house of Congress. 299  The bill would have allowed consumers to  
access, correct, and block the use of their private information for 
marketing purposes.300  It would have also given the FTC explicit  
authority to create new rules for dealing with data brokers and even 
create a data hub where individuals could view what personal infor-
mation was being used by data brokers.301 While the bill, which fo-
cused on accountability and transparency, was supported by privacy 
groups and nonprofit organizations alike,302 it failed to gain any real 
political support or actual traction in Congress.303 
 Similar privacy focused state legislation has been announced 
throughout the country by private organizations. In January 2016, 
sixteen states simultaneously announced privacy protection legisla-
tion in what the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) described as 
“a nationwide coalition of legislators from both parties and advocacy 
groups from across the political spectrum.”304 These types of privacy 
promoting organizations, like the ACLU and the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC),305 can be influential in Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                       
 298. S. 668, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 
Mar. 4, 2015). 
 299. S. 668: Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150401234221/https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s6
68 [https://perma.cc/8ACN-4JZR] (according to the archived site, the bill only had a three 
percent chance of being enacted after it had been introduced during the last session of 
Congress). 
 300. Markey, Blumenthal, Whitehouse and Franken Introduce Legislation to Ensure 
Transparency and Accountability in Data Broker Industry, MARKEY.SENTATE.GOV (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-blumenthal-whitehouse-
and-franken-introduce-legislation-to-ensure-transparency-and-accountability-in-data-
broker-industry [https://perma.cc/7FCC-T9RD]. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. This lack of political will for these types of bills has been shown repeatedly, with 
previous bills also dying with little to no movement in Congress. See, e.g., Data Broker 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 2025, 113th Cong. (2014); Data Accounta-
bility and Trust Act of 2014, H.R. 4400, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 304. Nationwide Effort Aims to Empower Americans to “Take Control” of Their Privacy, 
ACLU (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/16-states-dc-introduce-legislation-limit-
surveillance-and-protect-student-and-employee-privacy [https://perma.cc/MPM6-GAKM]; 
see also #TakeCTRL: Nationwide Privacy Push, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/takectrl-
nationwide-privacy-push [https://perma.cc/NY8P-XALW] (overviewing the range of state 
legislative efforts to protect personal data, student data, employee data, and location track-
ing data); Greenberg, supra note 273. 
 305. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org (last visited July 30, 2017). EPIC 
states that their mission is to “focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties 
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cases by submitting amicus briefs outlining often complex and tech-
nical issues.306 These organizations often even have their own initia-
tives and plans for strengthening personal data rights. EPIC, for  
instance, launched Data Protection 2016—a campaign dedicated to 
making data protection policies, such as notice, safeguards, surveil-
lance, and enforcement, a political issue in the 2016 presidential race.307 
B.   Solutions from the Private Sector 
 The government is not the only entity invested in privacy issues 
stemming from big data. Corporations rely on big data308 and, accord-
ingly, have a stake in the comfort of users in disclosing information 
to them. In February 2016, Apple refused to assist the government in 
gaining access to a locked iPhone for which the company had de-
signed the operating software and encryption, going so far as to deny 
a request in the form of a legally issued order.309 In an open letter to 
customers, Apple CEO Tim Cook explained why the company was 
challenging the order.310 According to Cook, the request to undermine 
the security of Apple’s operating system would set a dangerous prec-
edent and would give the government “power to reach into anyone’s 
device to capture their data.”311 
 The letter adopted an overtly patriotic narrative, which served to 
frame the company’s challenge as an action that Apple was forced to 
take in order to protect the privacy of their customers against an 
overreaching, uninformed government. 312  On the other hand, the  
Department of Justice attorneys in the case viewed and insisted that 
                                                                                                                  
issues and to protect privacy, freedom of expression, and democratic values in the infor-
mation age.” Id.  
 306. See EPIC Amicus Curiae Briefs, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/ 
amicus [https://perma.cc/QK4Q-5WUD] (listing amicus curiae briefs filed in appellate 
courts by the EPIC related to issues such as consumer privacy, government surveillance, 
and the Fourth Amendment). 
 307. Data Protection Platform, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://dataprotection2016.org 
[https://perma.cc/EP6J-CZGW] (providing questions to ask candidates to determine their 
views on data privacy and protections). 
 308. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 309. Cook, supra note 9 (noting that while they complied with the FBI’s requests for 
information, they were refusing to help the government build a backdoor into their iPhone 
operating system). 
 310. Id. (claiming the FBI had requested that Apple remove certain security features 
and add new ones to give the government access to essentially all iPhone users’ data). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. The letter is peppered with allusions to patriotism and constitutional free-
doms, using phrases like, “the deepest respect for American democracy” and “love of our 
country,” while describing the government’s actions as “an overreach by the U.S. govern-
ment” that would give the government “the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture 
their data.” Id. 
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Apple’s refusal was primarily motivated by financial and business 
concerns with respect to potential harms to its reputation and brand, 
and they emphasized the national security issues at stake as well.313 
Regardless of the motivation behind Apple’s refusal, the company 
capitalized on the case to not only force a public discussion about the 
ambiguous legal boundaries surrounding access to corporate data,314 
but also to present itself as a beneficent protector of America’s sensi-
tive information.315 The move gained the support of advocacy groups 
like the ACLU, who went so far as to file an amicus brief in support 
of Apple.316 The organization echoed Apple’s concerns that allowing 
the government to compel Apple in this way would pose a serious 
threat to personal privacy, making it clear that the ACLU was on 
Apple’s side.317 In the end, the FBI managed to hack into the iPhone, 
ending the debate between the principles of privacy versus security 
without the public or the law actually forming real conclusions.318 
However, when corporations like Apple work in this way to actively 
guard their customers’ privacy, the notion of a corporate right to pri-
vacy as an avenue for protection becomes increasingly attractive. 
                                                                                                                       
 313. Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February 
16, 2016 Order Compelling Assistance in Search at 6, In re Search of Apple iPhone Seized 
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License 
Plate 35KGD203, No. CM 16-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016). 
 314. Cook, supra note 9 (emphasizing that Apple was asking America “to step back and 
consider the implications”). 
 315. See, e.g., Oremus, supra note 274 (referring to Tim Cook’s statement as “big, bold, 
and philosophical, and it sets Apple up to carry what might seem an unlikely banner for a 
Silicon Valley tech giant: the banner of citizens’ right to protect their own data”); Klint 
Finley, Apple’s Noble Stand Against the FBI is Also Great Business, WIRED (Feb. 17, 2016, 
9:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-noble-stand-against-the-fbi-is-also-great-
business [https://perma.cc/4Q94-PLK3] (“Apple has been trying to position itself as a pro-
tector of privacy, a kind of anti-Google, since long before the FBI’s court order.”). 
 316. Brief of Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Northern Cali-
fornia, ACLU of Southern California, and ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties, in 
Support of Apple, Inc., In re Search of Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a 
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. CM 16-
10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016). 
 317. See Noa Yachot, 7 Reasons a Government Backdoor to the iPhone Would Be Cata-
strophic, ACLU (Feb. 25, 2016, 5:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/7-reasons-
government-backdoor-iphone-would-be-catastrophic [https://perma.cc/5NBU-ZTZX] (argu-
ing that “all those warnings about the end of privacy that may have once sounded hyper-
bolic will have proved prescient” should the FBI prevail in compelling Apple). 
 318. See Fred Kaplan, Nobody Won the Apple-FBI Standoff, SLATE (Mar. 29,  
2016, 10:34 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/03/ 
the_fbi_ended_its_showdown_with_apple_and_neither_won.html [https://perma.cc/2JPP-
MN8U?type=image] (arguing that the FBI-Apple showdown ended in bruises for both enti-
ties’ reputations). The FBI had been seeking a test case for gaining access to Americans’ 
phones, and this one, involving a deceased mass murderer with ties to terrorism, had ex-
tremely good optics, so it was a disappointment to drop the case. Id. Apple, meanwhile, was 
on shaky legal grounds and had its reputation bruised when the iPhone software was suc-
cessfully breached. Id.  
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 1.   A Corporate Right to Privacy 
 While the concept of corporate personhood is nothing new in the 
United States, 319  well-publicized and highly politicized Supreme 
Court cases in recent years have increased widespread understand-
ing, or at least awareness, of the idea. Corporate personhood is the 
legal treatment of corporations as people for the purposes of certain 
constitutional protections.320 Congress has indicated to the Court that 
the legal term “person” includes associations, organizations, and cor-
porations.321 In 2010, the Court heard Citizens United v. FEC,322 a 
case concerning the permissibility of airing a political advertisement 
that potentially violated federal campaign law and Supreme Court 
precedent.323 Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act re-
stricted corporate expenditures for political speech that advocates a 
candidate.324 The Court, in making its decision, expressly overturned 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,325 Supreme Court prece-
dent from 1990 that upheld restrictions on corporate campaign ad-
vertisements.326 The Court in Citizens United reversed this precedent 
by a narrow 5-4 margin,327 holding that the government could not 
wholly silence political speech, though it could require transparency 
through disclaimers and spending disclosures. 328  Citizens United 
symbolized a solidification of corporate rights under the First 
                                                                                                                       
 319. See Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). In the headnote 
to this case, the court reporter proclaimed that the Court was all of the opinion that 
“[c]orporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States.” Id. 
 320. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014); Citi-
zens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341-43 (2010). 
 321. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2012) (defining “person” as an “individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or public or private organization other than an agency” under federal 
administrative law). 
 322. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 323. Id. at 320. 
 324. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012). This effectively banned corporate political speech, and 
similar laws had been upheld repeatedly in court as permissible campaign regulation to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310; see 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990) (upholding a state law ban-
ning corporate political expenditures); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (largely up-
holding provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act banning certain corporate elec-
tion expenditures and unlimited donations to political parties). 
 325. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 326. Id. The Court noted that Michigan’s law was aimed at “the corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corpora-
tion’s political ideas.” Id. at 660. 
 327. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 393. 
 328. Id. at 371 (“This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions 
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”). 
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Amendment,329 with the Supreme Court clearly and unambiguously 
stating their position.330 According to the Court, “[n]o sufficient gov-
ernmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit 
or for-profit corporations.”331 
 Four years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the question 
of when corporate entities are legally considered persons for the pur-
poses of legal analysis.332 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,333 a 
case concerning legally required insurance coverage for contracep-
tion,334 the Court sparked widespread public controversy and debate 
about the legitimacy and wisdom of the corporate form being granted 
rights historically assumed to be restricted to natural persons.335 The 
case was another 5-4 split, with the business-friendly majority find-
ing once again that corporations can hold and express rights, includ-
ing religious expression, even if doing so burdens their employees’ 
rights.336 The Court found that within the meaning of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act,337 a corporation could be considered a “per-
son,” and its exercise of religion was therefore protected.338 These cas-
                                                                                                                       
 329. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 330. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (“Governments are often hostile to speech, but 
under our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make 
this political speech a crime.”). 
 331. Id. at 364. The Court also noted that corporations “may possess valuable exper-
tise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, 
including the speech of candidates and elected officials.” Id. 
 332. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
 333. Id. at 2751. 
 334. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Under the 
ACA, passed in 2010, large employers like Hobby Lobby must provide health insurance 
coverage that includes free “preventive care” for women, which, through regulations, in-
cludes contraception. Id.; see Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES 
& SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines2016/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L4BQ-9QBH]. 
 335. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Corporations Are People, and They Have More Rights 
Than You, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
adam-winkler/corporations-are-people-a_b_5543833.html [https://perma.cc/6WT4-73F9] 
(arguing that the Court’s decision favored a corporation’s right to religious liberty over 
their female employees’ right to equal access to legally-mandated health benefits); Bin-
yamin Appelbaum, What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/what-the-hobby-lobby-ruling-means-
for-america.html (arguing that expanding corporate constitutional rights creates a danger 
that is “not only that corporations can act at the expense of society, but also that the people 
who control them can act at the expense of their own shareholders, employees and customers”). 
 336. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
 337. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4  (2012). 
 338. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69. 
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es show the proliferating tendency of the current Court to find that cor-
porations are people under the law, with similar rights to individuals.339 
 Some scholars have discussed, in the wake of cases such as Citi-
zens United and Hobby Lobby, the potential recognition and applica-
tion of a corporate right to privacy as a limited form of protection 
against warrantless searches of personal information by governmen-
tal actors.340 In the 2011 case of FCC v. AT&T Inc.,341 however, the 
Supreme Court found that, for purposes of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)342 at least, corporations could not exercise privacy 
rights to refuse governmental requests for records.343 Justice Roberts, 
who authored the unanimous opinion,344 wrote: 
We reject the argument that because “person” is defined for pur-
poses of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrase “personal priva-
cy” in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection 
in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the 
ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy does not extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T 
will not take it personally.345 
Fueled by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby Lobby and Citi-
zens United, however, some academics have asserted that corpora-
tions have a right to privacy, at least when asserting that right would 
protect records that contain their customers’ sensitive personal in-
formation. 346  Under this argument, the corporate right to privacy 
would be a “bulwark” against governmental intrusion. 347  Corpora-
tions would, in effect, be expressing the privacy rights of their cus-
tomers to ensure that governmental searches comply with constitu-
                                                                                                                       
 339. See Appelbaum, supra note 335 (noting that the basic argument is that “corpora-
tions, owned by people, should have the same freedoms as people”). The addition in 2017 of 
Justice Neil Gorsuch will likely exacerbate this trend. See, e.g., Nick Wells & Mark Fahey, 
The US Supreme Court is More Friendly to Businesses Than Any Time Since World War II, 
CNBC (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-friendly-
data-show.html [https://perma.cc/7WRA-CWD7] (noting that Gorsuch, a very conservative 
jurist, is likely to make the Court even more receptive to business and corporate interests). 
 340. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Amy Sepinwall, Privacy and Organizational Persons, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 2275, 2320-21 (2015) (arguing that in addition to or instead of a right to 
privacy, corporations may have an actual duty to protect the privacy of individuals whose 
data they collect); Robinson, supra note 277. 
 341. 562 U.S. 397 (2011). 
 342. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 343. AT&T, 562 U.S. at 409-10. 
 344. Id. at 410 (Justice Kagan took no part in the decision). 
 345. Id. at 409-10. 
 346. Robinson, supra note 277, at 2309. 
 347. See generally id. at 2309. 
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tional requirements.348 Other scholars are skeptical that the Court 
will approve an extension of the constitutional right to privacy to 
corporations.349 This skepticism is especially true in light of FCC v. 
AT&T, Inc. and the often-referenced United States v. Morton Salt 
Co.,350 where the Court held that corporations cannot claim an identi-
cal right to privacy as individuals.351  
 Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the Supreme Court does rec-
ognize a corporate right to privacy, it is not clear how much addition-
al protection, if any, this novel right would provide individuals. Cor-
porations, acting within the legal protections of a right to privacy, 
could waive their rights, just as individuals may normally waive fun-
damental constitutional rights. 352  The willful cooperation between 
corporate actors and governmental agencies in the disclosure of cus-
tomer information has been well reported.353 When considering how 
much faith to place in a corporate right to privacy as a substantial 
means of protecting privacy, Americans must ask themselves how 
much they actually trust the corporations with whom they entrust so 
much data. 
                                                                                                                       
 348. Id. at 2319 (noting that a corporate right to privacy could work by “protecting the 
corporation’s stand-alone interests, acting as a check on government surveillance, and pro-
tecting the more personal and emotional aspects of the right to privacy of the customers”). 
 349. See generally Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
27 (2014) (arguing that while it is an open question whether there is a corporate right to 
privacy, the Court has been inconsistent in determining when corporate rights normally 
retained by natural persons are available). Pollman also notes that there is a normative 
argument against permitting corporations to have unlimited privacy rights, which could 
create a weapon to “powerfully shield them from investigation or regulation.” Id. at 31. 
 350. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
 351. Id. at 652 (holding that “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the 
enjoyment of a right to privacy”). 
 352. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (discussing how the require-
ment of an individual holder of a right to personally participate in waiving it, and the pro-
cedures necessary for the waiver, are dependent on the right being waived). 
 353. See, e.g., Spencer Ackermann & Dominic Rushe, Microsoft, Facebook, Google 
and Yahoo Release US Surveillance Requests, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/microsoft-facebook-google-yahoo-fisa-
surveillance-requests [https://perma.cc/TS3R-EFE5]; Michael Riley, U.S. Agencies Said  
to Swap Data with Thousands of Firms, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-
thousands-of-firms [https://perma.cc/TNX4-WKK4]. Even in the dispute between Apple and 
the FBI, Apple willingly turned over other customer data requested by the FBI, as is 
standard practice among corporations cooperating with law enforcement. See, e.g., Fred 
Kaplan, The Battle Between Apple and the FBI Is So Heated Because It’s So Unprecedented, 
SLATE (Mar. 2, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/ 
2016/03/the_stakes_in_the_battle_between_apple_and_the_fbi_are_higher_than_you_think.h
tml [https://perma.cc/J38W-7DYV?type=image] (discussing the norm of high levels of cor-
porate cooperation with governmental investigations and law enforcement, including active 
participation in the NSA’s PRISM surveillance program). 
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 Corporate actors do not always appear to be concerned about per-
sonal privacy and, to the contrary, they often seem intent on invading 
it to increase sales.354 A good example is the 2016 settlement between 
the FCC and Verizon over the company’s use of “supercookies.”355 
Verizon, without the knowledge or consent of its customers, inserted 
supercookies—coded, unique, computer-generated identifiers—into 
the internet-enabled devices of its users to track their online use, 
gather information, and deliver targeted ads.356 Following the FCC’s 
investigation into this behavior, Verizon agreed to conform their 
practices to a three-year compliance plan, as well as pay a fine of 
$1.35 million.357 But despite such outright disrespect for customers, 
corporations still appear to garner enough trust among customers for 
them to continue sharing their data.358  
 The 2015 study by the Pew Research Center revealed that, gener-
ally, Americans have little confidence in either the government or 
corporations to keep their data confidential and secure.359 Numerous 
news outlet studies and investigations point to similar conclusions, 
with faint findings that people tend to trust companies more than 
their own government.360 It appears that people may trust some com-
panies more than the government, 361 or they may generally trust 
companies over agencies,362 but the general public’s confidence in cor-
porations to guard our personal information remains decidedly low.363 
Additionally, internet user polling indicates that while Google ranks 
                                                                                                                       
 354. This Article is founded on this general assumption, as noted extensively through-
out the above text. 
 355. FCC Settles Verizon, supra note 287. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See generally MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10; see also supra notes 11-14 and 
accompanying text. 
 359. MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10 at 6-7 (showing between 1% and 9% of the public 
were “very confident” in either the government or private companies to keep their infor-
mation secure). 
 360. See Hugh Langley, When It Comes to Our Data, We Trust Google More Than We 
Trust the Government, TECHRADAR (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/ 
internet/when-it-comes-to-our-data-we-trust-google-more-than-we-trust-the-government-
1305751 [https://perma.cc/F575-NDTG] (noting that in a survey of 3,563 users, 31% of re-
spondents reported that they “trusted the government least with their data”); It’s Your 
Personal Information. Who Do You Trust with Your Data?, MYLIFE: BLOG (Aug. 27, 2014),  
https://www.mylife.com/blog/latest-stories/study-americans-dont-trust-the-people-
guarding-their-personal-information (finding that in a survey of 4,000 Americans, Google and 
LinkedIn were slightly more trusted than the government with customers’ personal data). 
 361. MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10, at 7. 
 362. See Langley, supra note 360. 
 363. MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10, at 7 (explaining that 2% of adults surveyed felt 
“[v]ery confident” in search engine providers to keep data private and secure, and only 1% 
were “[v]ery confident” in social media websites). 
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relatively high in data security compared to government and other 
corporate actors,364 other companies, such as social media companies 
like Facebook, are even less trusted than the government.365 The Pew 
report indicated that just one percent of adults felt “[v]ery confident” 
that social media sites would keep records of their online activity se-
cure.366 TechRadar, an online technology news outlet, and MyLife, a 
privacy-focused internet company, both conducted studies that found 
that Facebook was one of the least trusted companies when it came 
to the handling of personal information and ranked, in both cases, 
lower than the government.367 However, this evident lack of trust 
may not carry much sway with consumers who regularly use and en-
joy services like Facebook. As one article reported, the “handling of 
personal information by private companies is what our readers found 
most problematic, with nearly every contributor openly distrustful of 
internet companies, yet with many contributors admitting they use 
those services regardless of these worries.”368 The seeming disconti-
nuity in people’s feelings is understandable. It would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to participate in modern society without inadvertent-
ly and nearly constantly sharing information with corporations and 
the government.369 
 Edward Snowden, the government contractor who was in many ways 
responsible for the resurgence in public interest in personal privacy,370  
again joined the privacy discussion in March 2016.371 Snowden ap-
                                                                                                                       
 364. See Langley, supra note 360 (noting that 10% of respondents trusted Google the 
least with their data, compared to the 31% that trusted government the least); MYLIFE, 
supra note 360 (noting that 47.2% of respondents in the survey reported that they trusted 
Google with their information, compared to the 23.2% that trusted the government). 
 365. MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 10, at 7. 
 366. Id. Only 10% of respondents said that they were even “[s]omewhat confident.” Id. 
 367. See Langley, supra note 360 (noting that 33% of respondents trusted Facebook the 
least with their data, compared to the 31% that indicated the government; Facebook was 
found to be the “least trusted” of all the options provided); MYLIFE, supra note 360 (noting 
that 17.1% of those surveyed trusted Facebook with their information, compared to the 
23.2% that trusted the government). 
 368. McMullan, supra note 29. 
 369. See Julia N. Mehlman, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie, It’s Going to Ask 
for Your Personally Identifiable Information, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 329, 346 (2015) (“Some 
argue that to participate fully and take advantage of modern, innovative society, one must 
have Internet access.”). 
 370. See Lee, supra note 78 (discussing, in the days immediately following Snowden’s ex-
posure of the program, the revelations about PRISM, the corporate denials of enabling broad 
surveillance, and the public outcry regarding NSA’s seeming invasion of individual privacy). 
 371. Jon Gold, Edward Snowden: Privacy Can’t Depend on Corporations Standing Up to 
the Government, NETWORKWORLD (Mar. 19, 2016, 2:07 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/ 
article/3046135/security/edward-snowden-privacy-cant-depend-on-corporations-standing-up-
to-the-government.html [https://perma.cc/QM7Q-8CKR] (noting Snowden argued that not 
only is unquestioning faith in corporations to protect our privacy ill-advised, but “tech gi-
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peared, by video conference, at Free Software Foundation’s Li-
brePlanet 2016 conference, held at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.372 At the event, Snowden talked about the willingness 
with which companies have disclosed information to the government 
and the dangers of entrusting often-complicit corporations with per-
sonal data compared to free software’s transparency and openness.373 
In light of the fact that public confidence in companies to act on be-
half of their customers is low and the reality that consumers may 
continue to use the services of companies they do not trust, this 
warning is certainly reasonable. Certain companies, however, spe-
cialize in protecting data for individual users, representing yet an-
other possible solution to threats associated with big data. 
 2.   Market-Based Solutions 
In a marketplace of ideas where culture is king and data moves 
faster than people—where scalable opportunities come from turnkey 
solutions . . . . 
—Actor Max Greenfield as “Schmidt” in FOX’s New Girl374 
 Another potential piece of the puzzle in the pursuit of protection 
against the threat of big data is the market’s reaction to a perceived 
need that has yet to be fully served. In response to the monetization 
of personal data and the emergence of the data broker industry,375 
some companies have emerged that offer services to help customers 
identify and purge information from accessible online databases. Safe 
Shepherd, for instance, focuses on types of data that are not as regu-
lated or protected as health or credit information. According to the 
company:  
Safe Shepherd constantly scans the internet and private data-
bases, looking for your personal information. When we find a com-
pany publicizing or selling your personal information, we submit 
an opt-out request on your behalf, which deletes your record. If a 
website doesn't allow us to automatically remove your information, 
                                                                                                                  
ants have already proven more than willing to hand over user data to a government they 
rely on for licensing and a favorable regulatory climate”). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. Free software may provide better security because it is more modular and, by 
being open-source, permits many more users to identify potential weaknesses, as compared 
to proprietary corporate software. See, e.g., Katherine Noyes, Why Linux Is More Secure 
Than Windows, PCWORLD (Aug. 3, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/202452/ 
why_linux_is_more_secure_than_windows.html [https://perma.cc/KM8P-RQLS]. 
 374. New Girl: All In (FOX television broadcast Sept. 17, 2013). 
 375. See discussion supra Section II.A.2. 
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we’ll provide straightforward instructions for how to handle the 
exposure.376 
The measures taken by Safe Shepherd are intended to guard custom-
er data in the absence of meaningful protection implemented by the 
government or fostered by public opinion. The company’s founder, 
Robert Leshner, spoke of his company’s place in the market during a 
2013 interview, saying that, “People think of us as a way of outsourc-
ing their privacy, and so we work on our users’ behalf so they don't 
have to.”377 Leshner went on to remark that his company’s approach 
differed from the techniques used by companies, like Reputa-
tion.com,378 that merely seek to suppress undesirable results.379 Repu-
tation.com, unlike Safe Shepard, focuses primarily on businesses, not 
individuals, and operates by soliciting reviews in order to amass posi-
tive feedback, leading to improved overall ratings and eventually 
more business.380  
 Abine is another company that has entered the emerging retail 
privacy protection market.381 The company sells smart tools for con-
sumers to actively protect their own personal data.382 Abine’s primary 
products are Blur, which protects information at its originating point 
(the user’s input device), and DeleteMe, which removes information 
at its assorted termini.383 Blur generates, secures, and synchronizes 
passwords across devices;384 provides masked emails, an option where 
customers may submit an alias email address (generated and secured 
by Abine), to help avoid the unwanted dissemination of their account 
information;385 creates masked cards, which similarly hide real credit 
card information from online transactions by automatically generat-
ing a temporary credit card number;386 and overall works to diminish 
                                                                                                                       
 376. SAFE SHEPHERD, https://www.safeshepherd.com/how (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 377. Erin Barry & Joanna Weinstein, Tackling Internet Privacy: Safe Shepherd Joins 
the Fray, CNBC (Apr. 16, 2013, 12:11 PM) (quoting Robert Leshner), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
id/100645791 [https://perma.cc/C5QM-Y9ZJ]. 
 378. REPUTATION.COM, https://www.reputation.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 379. Barry & Weinstein, supra note 377. 
 380. REPUTATION.COM, supra note 378. 
 381. ABINE, https://www.abine.com (last visited July 30, 2017). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Let’s Talk About Passwords, ABINE, https://dnt.abine.com/#feature/passwords 
[https://perma.cc/MS84-64ER?type=image]. 
 385. Masked Information, ABINE, https://dnt.abine.com/#feature/masking [https://perma.cc/ 
P2VC-ASGJ?type=image]. 
 386. Blur—Masked Cards—4 Simple Steps, ABINE, https://dnt.abine.com/#feature/ 
payments [https://perma.cc/2L4N-7ZTS?type=image]. 
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methods of tracking online activity.387 Blur focuses on protecting pri-
vate data at its source, where it is being created, by masking infor-
mation submitted to third parties and by securing user data through 
advanced encryption techniques. 388  Abine’s other major product, 
DeleteMe, on the other hand, focuses on information that is already 
published online. 389  The service removes publicly available infor-
mation—including contact information, social media use, and per-
sonal photos—from people search sites, like the ones suggested in the 
introduction, and other data-collecting sites390 by sending opt-out re-
quests on behalf of its users.391 Unfortunately, this removal is limited. 
According to Abine, DeleteMe cannot remove information from web-
sites that do not provide an opt-out capability (many of which are 
outside of the United States), and the service cannot affect Google 
search results.392 
 Privacy protection companies operate in the context of particularly 
troublesome issues, such as the relative ease with which data can be 
duplicated and the increasingly permanent nature of digital data it-
self.393 In fact, this difficulty is progressively becoming an issue in law 
enforcement, where the digital duplication of suspects’ personal com-
puter devices raises similar privacy concerns.394 Even if privacy pro-
tection companies were successful in eliminating all of the available 
online data published on an individual, which by their own admission 
is not possible,395 this would not affect unpublished information held 
by data brokers, nor would it alter accessible website backups, such 
as those available online through archival efforts, like the nonprofit, 
Internet Archive.396 
 The services that companies like Safe Shepherd and Abine provide 
present unique market-based approaches to supplementing personal 
data protection. Somewhat ironically, these solutions involve a user 
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paying one company (a privacy protection company) to remove data 
from a second company (a data broker or people search website) that 
is already profiting from collecting, selling, or publishing the user’s 
data, and who may have acquired the data from a third company (an 
online retailer or other corporation), who also profited from the user 
at the point of the data origination. All three companies in this sce-
nario profit from the receipt or sale of the user’s data, while the user 
is left paying more than assumed or often disclosed, in the form of 
personal information, for the privilege of shopping online. Additional-
ly, pay-for-privacy solutions inevitably favor those who can afford the 
services, fostering economic inequality in the protection of individual 
privacy and from various types of fraud.397 The problem may simply 
be too large and pervasive for both individuals and smaller private 
businesses to tackle alone. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
  There are many possible avenues available for addressing the 
threat to Americans’ privacy represented by the massive accumula-
tion and aggregation of personal data. Data brokers, as the poster 
children for big data, challenge the boundaries of what constitutes an 
invasion of privacy in the eyes of the Supreme Court, and their en-
during lack of regulation suggests that solutions must also be found 
elsewhere. However, it is still imperative that governmental agen-
cies, such as the FTC, pursue more robust and aggressive regulation 
within their existing authority, and that Congress enact broader 
grants of executive authority and legal protections through new legis-
lation to help disincentive and discourage improper use, or misuse, of 
personal data. An established corporate right to privacy has potential 
also to offer some protection for individual consumers from govern-
mental intrusion, although the possibility that such protection could be 
waived and the risks inherent in expanding corporate constitutional 
rights are serious and should not be ignored. As corporations increas-
ingly present themselves as self-appointed guardians of personal data, 
a corporate right to privacy could form another barrier to intrusion on 
the privacy of consumers, but this would still depend on consumer 
trust in these companies. In the meantime, companies like Safe Shep-
herd and Abine offer alternative solutions to impede or at least curtail 
the onslaught of personal information collection and aggregation. 
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 The trend of big data usage will likely continue to proliferate, with 
both governmental and corporate actors relying more heavily on the 
analytics and insights it provides in their decisionmaking, policymak-
ing, and marketing strategies. Unregulated data brokers will also 
almost definitely continue to build and sell vast, complex, and in-
creasingly comprehensive datasets on individuals. Additionally, more 
and more companies are likely to collect information from their cus-
tomers with the intention of later profiting from the sale of that data. 
As long as consumers continue to share information in exchange for 
services, and every indicator suggests they will, the threat posed by 
the galaxy of personal information will escalate. This is a policy area 
where there is a clear and identifiable threat to the American people, 
an issue the people themselves are legitimately and transparently 
incapable of solving on their own. Given the general public’s low con-
fidence in both public and private actors responsible for and active in 
data collection and use, this is an apparent opportunity for both pub-
lic and private actors to act decisively and aggressively to regain the 
trust and goodwill of the people. Through a multipronged approach, 
via stronger regulation, new legislation, assertion of corporate rights, 
and market-based solutions, the government and corporations alike 
have the ability and obligation to safeguard the people by becoming 
true guardians of the galaxy of personal data. 
 
